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PREFACE 
This work forms part of a programme of studies on the functioning of 
the competitive process in the economy of the European Community. 
Various national institutes and experts have been appointed by the 
Connission to carry out the study programme. 
In view of the specific and general interest of these studies and the 
undertakings given by the Commission to the European Parliament, they 
are published in full in their original version. 
The Commission refrains from commenting, except to say that 
responsibility for the data and views set out in each study lies 
entirely with the institute or expert who produced it. 
The other studies in the same series will be published by the 
Commission as soon as possible. 
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SUMMARY 
The present study examines the subject of the organization and 
functioning of Public Enterprises in Portugal and Spain. It 
investigates their importance in the respective economies and 
then proceeds to an analysis of the system of competition in 
various sectors, taking into consideration the recent adhesion 
of the two countries to the European Economic Community. 
As a general framework for the study, we shall begin by estab-
lishing an operating concept of the Public Enterprise, and what 
results and an explanation of the State Company Sector of the 
Iberian economies. 
The treatment of the entirety of the Public Enterprises in both 
Portugal and Spain, has been made the basis of statistical data 
available (the year 1985, taking into consideration possible 
actualizations with reference to 1986 and 1987), as well as leg-
islation in force at present. 
Lisbon, October 1987 

INTRODUCTION 
The study proceeds to an exhaustive analysis of the State Com-
pany Sector in Portugal and Spain, based on the following: 
i) Legal analysis of the problem of public enterprises and 
of state held monopolies; 
ii) Economic analysis of the substantive structure of the 
state held companies; 
iii) Analysis of the behavior of public agents as factors 
which may eventually distort the equality of 
competition. 
Questions of the adaption of state monopolies of a commercial 
nature, which derive from the Act of Accession, and questions 
concerned with the State's (financial) support as well as the 
financial relationship between the State and state held com-
panies are considered in depth. 
With respect to Portugal, limiting the sphere of the work to the 
contours of the definition of the State Companies Sector in the 
Communities, of a potential entirety of 337 companies that could 
be grouped under this concept (77 Public Enterprises and 260 
with majority participation and those which have been 
nationalized), the present analysis encompasses 237 (77 Public 
Enterprises and 160 Participating in the Continent), which is a 
representative sample, not only from the quantitative point of 
view, but also from the qualitative. These companies in their 
entirety, and, on the average, in the period between 1983 and 
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1985, represent about 28 per cent of the gross value added (GVA) 
of the total of the economy, 32 per cent of the Gross Formation 
of Fixed Capital (GFFC) and 7.5 per cent of Employment, an 
amount that reaches ten per cent, if we exclude agriculture, 
where the State Company Sector plays a less important role. 
With respect to Spain one can say that the Non-financial Public 
Enterprises represented in 1985, based on the data on Chart VI, 
9.2 per cent of the Gross Internal Product, 16 per cent of the 
Gross Formation of Fixed Capital and 4.6 per cent of Employment, 
the latter percentage increasing to 5.5 per cent if one excludes 
agri culture. 
Thus, the entire analysis of the typology of competition, which 
constitutes the focal point of this study, has been elaborated 
having from the perspective of the removal of active interven-
tion by the State which has been announced in both Portugal and 
Spai n. 
Particular attention has been given to the analysis of the most 
relevant economic sectors in which Public Enterprises operate. 
The third part of this study deals with those sectors. 
Each of the sectors of the analyzed sectors of the Portuguese 
economy has been considered in the following terms: 
- Brief general description / introduction; 
- Control of activity by the State; 
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- Market- Shares; 
- Financial Relations between the State and Public 
Enterprises; 
- Price Regime; 
- Accession to production factors; 
- Public Markets; 
- Philosophy of Competition. 
The methods used as concerns the Spanish economy, despite some 
formal differences, give essentially the same results, i. e., 
they describe the operations and behavior of Public Enterprises 
in the market from a critical perspective. 
The different methods used in the study are related to the 
differences in the organization of the statistical regimes of 
the two Member-States, although final objectives of the study 
are the same. 
As concerns Portugal, at the end of 1985, the last period for 
which data is available for the study of the State Company 
Sector, coincides with the end of a specific phase in the Portu-
guese political economy and with the beginning of a change, both 
in strict political terms and at the level of the orientation of 
short-term policy. The latter benefitted from very favorable 
economic conditions, both internal and external. 
Thus, the period of economic austerity which coincided with the 
years 1983 to 1985, permitted the control of the principal 
economic restraints, such as the external and budgetary deficit, 
external debts and inflation. 
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At the beginning of this new phase, the macro-economic strategy 
adopted was one of controlled increase of production and 
investment and, consequently, of employment, in order not to 
compromise the equilibrium of the other variables. 
These internal factors were reinforced by other external fac-
tors, which were also favorable: the fall in the price of petro-
leum together with the fall in the value of the dollar and the 
fall in interest rates in the international markets, which, in 
the period analyzed, constituted a strong constraint on our 
economy. 
Simultaneously, the entry of Portugal into the EEC and the 
beneficial effects which were occasioned by the integration, 
were reinforced by the favorable conjuction in the evolution of 
the Portuguese economy. 
In this context, it was assumed that the role of the State in 
the economy would be less important than it had been up to that 
time and that private initiative would reinforce its 
contribution as the motor of social and economic development. 
As a result of this orientation, the role of the State had al-
ready begun to diminish slightly in importance both in reference 
« 
to its patrimony and to its interventions and regulations. 
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This tendency has had the tendency to reinforce itself and will 
be still greater in the future, particularly after the elections 
of 19 July 1987. These elections created a stable majority for 
the government for the next four years, maintaining the same 
team which had developed the previous economic orientation, 
which creates a favorable picture of the potential for movement 
toward repri vati zation. At this moment, structural changes in 
the Fundamental Portuguese Law (Lei Fundamental Portuguesa) -
the Portuguese Constitution (Constituição da República), which 
sanctions socialization of the economy, nationalization and the 
enlargement of the role of the public sector) - are awaited. 
The foreseeable orientation of other basic documents as grand 
planning options for 1988 as well as the budget are not to be 
forgotten. 
The more recent State budgets have already revealed a reduction 
of amounts available for the State Company Sector and it is 
expected that this trend will become more pronounced. 
On the other hand, several methods of attempted repri vat ization 
of some Public Enterprises, or companies where the State was the 
majority participant, have been tested and although evolution 
was gradual, it was sometimes obstructed in the Assembly of the 
Republic (Assembleia da República). 
The change of Public Enterprises to companies with State held 
capital has been observed, as well as the sale of parts of some 
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companies of the State Company Sector, including some companies 
of the financial sector, in the stock exchange as a result of 
the reanimation of the capital markets. In addition, some 
companies have merged, with the merger justified by arguments of 
increased economic rationalization and current management. 
Thus, to conclude this study and project a view of the future, 
it seems adequate to use as our basis the program of the 
eleventh government, approved by the Assembly of the Republic, 
which planned a basic reform of the State Company sector. 
This reform is going to be established in three main directions 
i) Transformation of the Public Enterprises into 
corporations of mixed economy (with a majority of the 
State or of other public agencies); 
ii) Sale or change of the patrimonial elements of Public 
Enterprises ; 
iii) Sale of shares belonging to the State or other public 
agencies. 
As concerns the first of these directions, the Government — in 
conformity with its particular program — intends: 
to assure the entry of private risk capital into the Public 
Enterprises which are in the situation of selling shares on 
the stock market; 
to develop a strong component of small stockholders, 
benefitting particularly the employees of said companies; 
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to obtain financial means to be used toward other ends, both 
for reequi 1 i bri um of other large Public Enterprises which 
have run up excessive debts and to proceed to the anticipated 
amortization of public debt, and finally, to compensate, in 
part at least, the debt service resulting from nationaliza-
tion and expropriation during the years 1975 and 1976. 
It is assumed that the process of privatization of the State 
Company sector will be initiated prior to the constitutional 
revision of the beer, tobacco, concrete and cellulose sub-
sectors. It will result in the sale of a maximum of 49 per cent 
of the corporate capital, with amounts limited to ten per cent 
per entity or group. 
As concerns the second of these programatic directions, the 
Government especially intends: 
to create conditions favorable to the economic restructure 
and recovery of these companies, which, in the present legal 
picture, have been prevented from proceeding with divestment 
of certain assets, even when the assets do not affect the 
pri nei pal goal. 
As concerns the third programatic direction, the Government 
proposes to distinguish two sales regimes, one for the State as 
minority holder, the other for the State as majority holder. 
As regards the former, the rule of freedom of negotiation will 
be implemented. 
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As regards the latter, sales will be made using the mechanisms 
institutionalized in the capital market, when the size of the 
State justifies it. 
Lastly, the Government intends to reduce the State Company 
Sector exclusively to those State companies which assure 
essential public services, both through the Public Enterprises 
"stricto sensu," as well as through public corporations or 
corporations of mixed ownership. 
"The entirety of the State companies" -- to paraphrase the 
program of the eleventh Government -- "is to be reduced to 
companies of truely public service, which have-, of course, 
special obligations of social interest, and in which it is 
necessary to protect the most disadvantaged users. These 
companies will be compensated for the social component of goods 
and services they provide." 
In conclusion: in the short and medium term, a lesser interven-
tion on the part of the State in general and in the State Com-
pany Sector in particular, in the functioning of the Portuguese 
economy will take occur. This does not mean, however, that long 
time habits of tutelage in the form of one-time instances of 
discrimination on the part of the State to the benefit of this 
or that company are going to disappear. The present study 
contains numerous examples of this sort of discrimination. 
1 7 
As far as Spain is concerned, we can also mention the existence 
of political tendencies in the direction of privatization and 
in subordinating the role of the State to the criteria of eco-
nomic profitability. Spain is already integrated into the Euro-
pean Economic Community on a solid economic basis, but, like the 
situation that exists in other European countries, it has a ser-
ies of Sectors which are in crisis, due to a marked excess of 
capacity (Steel Industry, Naval Construction, Minerals, etc.). 
The policy followed in these sectors, is a the implementation of 
a new structure by means of an ajustment of capacity and 
restructuri ng. 
Among the instruments contemplated to make a State company effi-
cient it is necessary to mention the financial policy. As con-
cerns financial policy, one must distinguish between those 
companies which compete in free markets with others private, 
national or foreign companies, distinguishing the companies 
which are part of the Sectors in crisis, and those which provide 
pubi i c servi ces. 
The companies which participate in Sectors of the free market 
not in crisis adjust to the free functioning of the market. 
The public companies which are part of the Sectors in crisis, in 
general, need to be restructured, in order to assure their 
vi abi 1 i ty. 
Lastly, the public companies which provide public services 
oblige the State-Entrepreneur to waive normal profits. 
The State finances its companies, via apportionment of capital, 
as if it were a private stockholder, in proportion to the ex-
pected profits, but the State has more complex motives as con-
cerns the expected profits. Another form of financing of State 
companies is by means of direct subventions for exploitation 
(RENFE), which are justified on rare occasions, except for 
reasons of public service. Lastly, it finances the companies by 
means of subventions of public credit or by assumption of the 
debts of its companies on the part of the State. Use of this 
last finance mechanism is exceptional, except in the process of 
reconversion or change of character of the company. The problem 
is that according to EEC Treaty, most of these financial 
instruments are now forbidden. 
To consider the role of the State as Entrepreneur, we are taking 
as an example of Public Enterprises, the companies of Grupo INI, 
which were the first to participate in the free market. 
The strategy the State has adopted as regards the INI, a 
short term reduction of losses, in order to reinstitute the 
competitiveness of the firms, and in the middle term, their 
consolidation in the EEC market. 
Further, the INI has begun with the process of partial priva-
tization using the Borse to sell shares of its most profita-
ble companies, including ENDESA„ the parent company of the 
public electricity mi ni-hol ding; as well as to quote shares 
of a small number of other companies, a practice they plan to 
extend to their other companies. When shares of GESA were 
offered for sale, the public offer was a success with demand 
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exceeding the offering threefold. Other companies like ENCE 
or ENFERSA will be placed on the market in the near future. 
The "Dirección General del Patrimonio (General Direction of 
Patrimony)," has also privatized part of its companies, among 
them Hilaturas Gorzypium, which has been sold to a Catalan 
textile group. A company group headed by the Compañía 
Transmediterranea, and including Imepiel, Tracsa, Rumasa 
Hytasa and Intelhorce, is perhaps looking for a purchaser. 
As concerns the Compañía Telefónica, in which the State owns 
47 per cent of the capital, the State has opted to sell a 
part, in order to make investments. The first sale took 
place at the beginning of 1986, when the shares of Amper were 
sold on the Borse and rapidly absorbed by the market. 
More privatizations will follow this one; now the sale of 
Telettra and Intelsa is being negotiated. 
There is also discussion of the possible privatization of 
Aldeasa, the successful company which manages the duty free 
shops in the airports. 
The fever of privatization has already spread to the public 
petroleum holding, INH, which will be transformed from an 
entity under public law into a corporation, whose capital can, 
in part, be purchased on the Borse. 
This government policy favorable to privatization as well as to 
the abandonment by public companies of some industrial and 
service sectors, allows the prediction that the State Company 
Sector will be reduced, and at the same time strengthened. 
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1. The Concept of Public Enterprise 
There are substantial distinctions between the concept of public 
enterprise under Portuguese law on the one hand, and Spanish and 
Community law on the other. Thus, it is important immediately 
to proceed to an indispensable conceptual clarification, prior 
to any sort of discussion of the themes of the present study. 
Beginning with the Portuguese case -- as opposed to what 
previously existed in Portugal — since 1976, there is a 
concept of legal restriction of the entirety of Public 
Enterprises, verified in Decree-Law No. 260/76, of 8 April, 
which approved the "General Basis of Public Enterprises."1 
In accordance with this document, the only Public Enterprises 
to be considered, are "the nationalized enterprises and· the 
enterprises created by the State with its own capital, or 
founded by other public entitites, for an exploration of 
activities of an economic and social nature in accordance with 
the national plan for the economy..." 
1 Exclusive legal regime for Public Enterprises, regulating 
the attribution of legal personality and the measure of its 
capacity, also defining the creation, organization, 
management and abolishment of Public Enterprises. 
In order to apply this concept, the number of Public Enterprises 
"stricto sensu," thus legally entitled, is just 77, together 
with about 300 companies with majority participation by the 
State and another 700 in which the State has a direct or 
indirect minority participation. 
One cannot, however, find a legal definition of Public 
Enterprises in the other EEC countries; thus, one has had to 
find doctrinal concepts to classify a certain organization as a 
Public Enterprise. 
As legal criteria would be comprehensible and unifying only with 
difficulty, due to the various legal forms assumed in each 
country by the same economic reality, factually and economi-
cally based criteria were pragmatically chosen, which emphasised 
the autonmous economic criteria and avoided legal criteria. 
In this way, objective notions based on predominantly economic 
considerations, were instituted in Europe, with a field of 
application larger than that presently in force in Portugal. 
This is the case with the definition adopted by the OCDE, for 
the purposes of a Normalised System for National Accounting: 
The Public Enterprises are production units of a commer-
cial nature, managed by the State, whether or not they 
have a company form, if they are, whatever the case may 
be, wholly or partially owned by the Public authorities 
and/or are controlled by said authorities and, due to 
their type of activity, use of technology and operation-
al form are to be included in the sector of activities 
of a commmercial nature. 
The concept adopted by the International Commission of the 
European Center for Public Enterprises ­­ CEEP, with 
headquarters in Brussels, is similar: 
Est considérée comme enterprise publique toute cellule 
économique qui vend des produits ou des services indus­
triels, comerciaux ou agricoles dans laquelle l'État, 
les collectivités ou établissements publiques, les au­
tres enterprises publiques sont propriétaires séparément 
ou ensemble, directement ou indirectement, d'une part de 
capital, dit capital public, dont l'importance: 
­ soit excède la moitié du capital de 1'enterprise ; 
­ soit même n'est que minoritaire, si dans ce dernier 
cas se conjuguent avec celle­ci des droits spécifiques 
permettant à la puissance publique de disposer effec­
tivement du pouvoir dans 1'enterprise.2 
Finally, Directive ΝΩ 80/723/EEC, of June 25, 1980,the 
Commission explained its understanding of the concept of 
"Public Enterprise," defining it in Article 2 as: 
any company in which the Public authorities (State or 
other territorial legal entity) may exercise, directly 
or indirectly, a dominant influence as a consequence of 
ownership, financial participation or rules which regu­
late it, 
adding that: 
2 With detail, e.g. Doc. CEEP 86/STAT.14/Comité 
Stati sti quês. 
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one presumes the existence of dominant influence when 
Public authorities, directly or indirectly, own the ma-
jority of available corporate capital, have a majority 
of votes or are able to nominate more than half the 
members of the administration, directorate or super-
vision of the company. 
In Spain, the concept of Public Enterprise is similar to 
that of the EEC, being substantially different than that of 
Portugal. 
In fact, Article 6, nQ 1, line 1) of the General Budget Law 
of January 4, 1977, states that Public Enterprises are 
"companies in which the participation of the State and/or 
Autonomous entities is a majority," and one can find the 
identical definition in the fourteenth additional rule to 
the Law NQ 44/83, of December 28. 
On the other hand, the law of the Autonomous State Entities 
determines that the participation of the State and/or 
Autonomous Entities should be a majority, except when a 
smaller participation is expressly authorized. 
Vis-a-vis the fluidity of the concept of a Public 
Enterprise, one must limit it within the entirety of the 
Public Sector, drawing attention to the three necessary 
characteristics for the qualification of an entity as a 
Public Enterprise: 
- That the State (Central Government) is majority owner; 
- That the main activity consists of the production of 
goods and services, including financial services and 
excluding those considered to be Public Administrative 
servi ces; 
- That they have a legal personality different than that 
of the State and Local Autonomous Governments. 
Thus, Spanish Public Enterprises are all companies in which 
the State has majority ownership, which have a separate 
legal personality and whose main activity is the production 
of goods and services, excluding those considered to be 
Public Administrative Services. 
In this study, we will adopt the EEC concept of Public 
Enterprise, both for the Portuguese and the Spanish case. 
2. The Importance of the State Company Sector 
2.1. In Portugal 
The relative impact of the State Company Sector in the 
entirety of the productive act.ivity in Portugal was, 
without a doubt, one of the most relevant in Europe from 
1974 until the present time. 
The weight the Companies of the Public Sector have, and the 
role that they play, in the Portuguese economy are of 
fundamental importance, owing to their domination over the 
key sectors of the economy and their role as an intrument of 
political economy, and by their insertion in the matrix of 
inter-Sector relations, and of inter-regional articulation, 
which can assure sectoral and global connection. 
For the realization of the present work, we will discuss the 
elements referred to in Point a: 
- Seventy-seven companies legally Constituted as Public 
Enterprises; included among these 54 which are non 
financial and 23 which are financial, of which 14 of 
the latter are Banks and 9 are Insurance Companies (Cf. 
Annex 1: Lists 1, 2 and 3). 
- 160 companies with majority participation,3 directly or 
indirectly by the State, of which 43 are with State 
"holding" participation ("IPE - Investimentos e 
Participações do Estado, SA"); in practical effects 
the companies of public capital4 were included in 
connection with this5 (Cf. Annex 1: List 4). 
3 Concepts explained i nfra. 
4 Ibid.. 
5 Except IPE, SA, which traditionally is included with the 
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It should bè noted that the total of State participation 
rises to about 1,000 companies; this entirety is confined to 
the 326 if we consider only those companies in which the 
State has more than fifty per cent of the corporate capital 
(Cf. Annex 1: Lists 5 and 6). 
This sub-grouping is reduced to about 260 if we exclude the 
foreign companies as well as those which are bankrupt or in 
some other irregular situation. 
The sample used in our study, of about 160 companies, 
encompasses the most important from the economic and 
financial point of view. 
In summary, limiting the sphere of the work to the contours 
of the definition of State Companies Sector in the 
Communities, of a potential entirety of 337 companies that 
could be grouped under this concept (77 Public Enterprises 
and 260 with majority participation and those which have 
been nationalized), the present analysis encompasses 237 (77 
Public Enterprises and 160 participating on the Continentfi ) , 
which is a representative sample, not only from the 
quantitive point of view, but also from the qualitative. 
non-financial Public Enterprises.* 
6 The autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores are not 
included here. 
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Using as a basis the most important macro-economic 
indicators, relative to the period 1979 to 1985, the 
influence which the companies have exercised in the last 
years in the entirety of global economic equalibrium, is 
revealed in Chart I. 
C H A R T I 
COMPARATIVE: EVOLUTION OF THE STATE COMPANIES SECTOR (ses) 
AND OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY (1979-1985) 
YEAR 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1962 
1983 
1984 
1963 
Absolute in­
crease be­
tween 1983 
and 1985 
Average rate 
increase be­
tween 1983 
and 1985 
Gross Value Added 
ses 
(1) 
195.7 
239.7 
307.1 
404.4 
527.7 
* 
608.0 
945.5 
418.1 
0.34 
N E ( a ) 
(2) 
918.6 
1115.9 
1334.4 
1678.0 
2079.9 
2591.7 
3177.6 
1097.7 
0.24 
™ | x IOC 
(3) 
21.3 
21.5 
23.0 
24.1 
25.4 
2B.0 
30.0 
38.0 
Gross Formation of 
Fixed Capital 
ses 
(4) 
76.4 
108.4 
161.8 
224.0 
209.5 
237.7 
317.0 
17.7 
0.04 
NE 
(5) 
264 
357.8 
458.7 
586.5 
672.4 
669.9 
766.7 
94.3 
0.07 
-^IxlOO 
(6) 
28.9 
30.3 
35.3 
38.2 
31.8 
35.5 
30.2 
18.8 
-
In 9 i 10 Portuguese escudos: current prices ; 
Employment(10 ) 
SCS 
(7) 
29.3 
300 
303 
309 
318 
307.7 
297.4 
-20.6 
-0.03 
NE 
(8) 
3852 
3924 
3969 
3959 
4155.9 
4079.6 
' 4048.8 
-107.1 
-0.01 
W) x 10° 
(9) 
7.6 
7.6 
7.6 
7.8 
7.7 
7.5 
7.3 
19.2 
-
Excluding 
agriculture 
(10) 
2676 
2804 
2910 
2934 
3178 
3081.5 
3115.4 
-62.6 
-0.01 
iZl χ 100 
(10) 
(11) 
10.9 
10.7 
10.4 
10.5 
10.2 
10.2 
9.7 
32.9 
-
^O'J ree: Records of the CEEP (Centre Europeen des Entreprises Publiques) 
ι 
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These companies in their entirety, and, on the average, in 
the period betwee-n 1983 and 1985, represent about 28 per 
cent of the gross value added (GVA) of the total of the 
economy, 32 per cent of the Gross Formation of Fixed Capital 
(GFFC) and 7.5 per cent of Employment, an amount that 
reaches ten per cent, if we exclude agriculture, where the 
State Company Sector plays a less important role. 
These relatively high percentages can be explained 
principally by the surge of nationalization which took place 
in Portugal in 1975 and which drew a considerable number of 
companies into the State Company Sector with which there 
were connections and which thus, indirectly, .became 
integrated in this entirety. Adding also that the 
activities of the companies connected to the public sector 
grew more quickly than those in the private sector, despite 
the fact that in the period under analysis an economic 
recession and an economically restrictive policy affected 
said companies, of which they were the one of the principal 
instruments of practical execution. 
The entirety of the companies of the State Company Sector 
enlarged their contribution to the GVA of the economy in its 
entirety, increasing from about 25 per cent in 1983 to 30 
per cent in 1985 (Chart I). This behavior is fundamentally 
due to the Public Enterprises which enlarged their partici-
pation of product from about 23 per cent to 27 per cent in 

C H A R T I I 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE VARIOUS INSTITUTIONAL SECTORS 
IN THE PORTUGUESE ECONOMY (per cent) 
Institutional Sectors 
Participating 
Companies 
Total Public 
Enterprises 
- Non-Finar¿ial Pu-
blic Enterprises 
- Financial Public 
Enterprises 
Total of SCS 
G V A 
1983 
2.8 
22.6 
15.5 
7.1 
25.4 
1984 
2.9 
25.1 
17.7 
7.4 
28.0 
1985 
3.0 
26.9 
17.5 
9.5 
30.0 
G F F C 
1983 
6.9 
24.2 
22.4 
1.8 
31 .1 
1984 
6.5 
29.0 
21.5 
7.5 
35.5 
1985 
3.9 
25.7 
18.1 
7.7 
29.6 
1983 
1.1 
6.6 
5.0 
1.7 
7.6 
employment 
1984 ' 
1.0 
6.5 
4.9 
1.7 
7.5 
, 
1985 
0.9 
6.4 
4.7 
1.7 
7.3 
Source: CEEP 
This fact contributed to an increase of approximately two 
percentage' points both in Non-financial Public Enterprises 
from 1983 to 1984 -- a value which stabilized in 1985 -- and 
in the Financial Public Enterprises which also increased 
from about 7 per cent in 1983 and 1984 to 9.5 per cent in 
1985. On the other hand, participating companies maintained 
a stable trend, although increasing, in this phase (Chart 
II). 
The continuing trend of increasing the amount of the value 
added by this sector of the economy is remarkable when one 
notes the trend of decreasing employment during the same 
period. 
In fact, the average nominal growth of the Gross Internal 
Product c. f. was 24 per cent between 1983 and 1985 (Chart 
I), revealing a less dynamic evolution than the evolution of 
the State Company Sector (34 per cent). In the latter case, 
however, attention must be called to the growth of Financial 
Public Enterprises (43 per cent), as opposed to 31 per cent 
for Non-financial companies, and 29 per cent for companies 
in which the State is the majority participant (Chart III). 
A - - F i n s i ; 
C H A R T I I I 
(Por tuga l ) 
EVOLUTION OF SCS EY INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR 
In Millions of rortuauese Escudos: current prices 
■ " — — — — — — ■■ I 
YEAC 
1983 
1934 
1985 
A r s c l j t e Grow:- Annusi Growth 
A . r i s ç e -ate c" A - . - J S Ì Growtn 
Pub l i c Enterpr ises 
GVA 
323.2 
459.3 
555.1 
231.9 
C.31 
I CPV 
823.1 
1078.3 
1199.8 
376.7 
0.21 
GFFC 
150.7 
143.8 
142.6 
-6 .1 
-0.03 
GPv 
205.7 
198.2 
189.4 
-16.3 
-0 .04 
Companies i n which the State i s the ma jo r i t y p a r t i c i p a n t 
GVA 
57.5 
75.5 
96.3 
38.8 
0.29 
GPv 
184.A 
231.7 
273.0 
88.6 
0.22 
GFFC 
46.4 
43.4 
29.9 
-16.5 
-0 .20 
Employment 
43.6 
40.7 
39.3 
-4 .3 
-0.C5 
T O T A L 
GVA I GPv 
380.7 
534.4 
651.4 
270.7 
0.31 
1007.5 
1310.0 
1472.8 
¿65.3 
0.21 
GFFC 
. 197.1 
187.2 
172.5 
-24.6 
-0 .06 
:.mployne<*t 
249.3 
238.2 
228.7 
-20.6 
-0.04 
rj­sneisi ¿eet: 
* * * · " " ■ 
1933 
1934 
1935 
- - - - : - - £ - r e t -
A , : s c , : a t e c ^ - _ a : G : : ^ 
Es-. . ; (s) 
Γ· . A 
134.5 
172.9 
2 7 9 . 2 
144.7 
0.44 
GPv 
151 .0 
194.0 
313.3 
162.3 
0 . -4 
G~>-J Empi-v~=-fl 
122.0 
502.0 
581.0 
459.0 
1.18 
58.7 
59.0 
59.0 
0.3 
CO 
Insurance r e t a l i e s 
GVA 
12.6 
. 17.5 
21.8 
9.2 
G.32 
GPv 
52.2 
63.7 
77.1 
24.9 
0.22 
G - : 
0.2 
0.3 
0.6 
C.4 
0.81 
E—:ove-1 
ICC 
9.7 
9.6 
0.4 
0.0 
s 
147. 1 
190.4 
301.0 
153.9 
2C3.1 
25 7 .7 
390.4 
167.3 
0.43 j 0.39 
GrFC 
12.4 
50.5 
58.7 
46.3 
1.18 
Empi c/ne·*.] 
68.7 
68.7 
68.6 
-0 .1 
O.OC 
(a) ­
« ­
r.c/ce: 
¡anos 
ι 
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The significance of this evolution is that the behavior of 
the State Company Sector served to stabilize somewhat the 
entire recession from which national production was 
sufferi ng. 
In reality, the growth rate of the Gross Internal Product p. 
m., corrected for inflation, was stationary in 1983 (-0.3 
per cent), suffered a slight loss in 1984 (- 1.7 per cent) 
and, finally, made a moderate recovery in 1985 (3.3 per 
cent ) . 
In fact, despite the previously-mentioned global economic 
crisis, the abolishment of important Public Enterprises in 
the State Company Sector during this period and the finan-
cial difficulties some companies which were integrated into 
this entirety suffered, the State Company Sector continued 
to play a positive role in the maintenance of national 
product i on. 
As concerns the Gross Formation of Fixed Capital, the aver-
age annual rate of increase in this period was much less 
than that of the national economy, four per cent as opposed 
to seven per cent (Chart I). Although the relative place 
of the State Company Sector in the economy remains large, it 
decreased from 1984 to 1985 (35.5 per cent to 29.6 per 
cent), due to existing restrictions on investment, e. g. in 
the Public Enterprises, which, in the context of a transi-
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tionary policy of contraction, represent an instrument of 
easy control for those responsible for economic policy. 
The Gross Formation of Fixed Capital was one of the indices 
which evolved least favorably in terms of national economy. 
The role of the Public Enterprise sub-grouping (tradì tonal 1 y 
very capital intensive) was very important for this evolu-
tion because the State controls the investment policy which, 
as a result of the emergency economic plan, was deliberately 
restricted. 
It was, however, the Financial Public Enterprises which 
prevented a larger drop in global investment in 1985, as a 
reduction of about half the amount of the Gross Formation of 
Fixed Capital in the companies in which the State was a 
majority participant occurred. An approximately three point 
reduction occurred in the Non-financial Public Enterprises, 
which represented an average annual decrease of four per 
cent, as opposed to a decrease of twenty per cent among the 
companies in which the State participated (Chart III). 
To stress the important contribution of the electric energy 
branch in the maintenance of investment, this branch, which 
is totally nationalized in Portugal, registered the great-
est increase in value (more than thirty per cent of the to-
tal investment in Non-financial Public Enterprises), having 
shown long years of high rates of increase (Cf. Annex 1: 
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List 7). 
Attention must also be called to the high values shown by 
the Post and Telecommunications branch and the losses regis-
tered in the Petroleum and Chemical branches, which in part, 
owed to divestment by some of the large investors. 
In contrast to this restrictive policy, the Public Enter-
prises were able to lower the level of their debt, particu-
larly as concerns external debt (which they were obliged to 
reduce, above all in previous years, in high amounts dispro-
portionate to internal credit), in order to contribute to 
the financing of the balance of payments. 
Being a powerful instrument of economic policy of the 
government had futher fatal implications in their invest-
ment, due to their contribution to the reduction of the 
deficit of the General Budget of the State (via reductions 
and delay in concession of capital endowment and compensary 
indemnity, which were necessary in view of the investment 
effort, sometimes over-extended; and to maintain prices 
lower than the real cost of production, which were imposed 
at certain times by the Government in order to control 
i nf1ation. 
It should be noted that, after all, the Public Enterprises 
contributed in a relevant form to the maintenance of some 
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important industrial sectors, such as civil construction and 
ironworks, through excessive stimulation of investment, 
which permitted the activity of those sectors to continue. 
In addition, they prevented the financial situation of some 
entities outside the State Company Sector from worsening, 
permitting delays in accounts receivable (for example, the 
case of the electrical company "EDP"). 
This set of factors was made worse in some Public Enter-
prises by the international economic crisis which, for 
example, affected the ironworks, chemical and shipbuilding 
sectors and some other companies which had started operating 
recenti y. · 
The situation had some unfavorable repercussions in the 
economic and financial structure of the companies. 
The relative weight of financial charges had a substantial 
increase, following the trend initiated during the previous 
years and recently stopped. Some items, like personnel 
expenses, decreased. 
Net profits decreased in some companies, the devaluation of 
the Portuguese escudo having contributed to this situation. 
Structural indices in the balance sheets of Non-financial 
Public Enterprises showed a deterioration in the degree of 
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financial autonomy, solvency, covering of assets and of 
fixed assets and of borrowing capacity. 
In the entirety of the companies in which the State is a 
majority participant, its use as an instrument of economic 
policy varied, both due to the smaller State share holding 
and to the fact that capital was held by other companies. 
A similar phenomenon occured, although to a lesser degree, 
in employment, which represented 7.7 per cent of the total 
in 1983, diminishing at a rate of 0.2 per cent per annum to 
7.3 per cent in 1985 (Chart I). 
The economic crisis during this period was reflected pri-
marily in the employment figures of the State Company Sec-
tor, which decreased by three per cent, as opposed to one 
per cent in the global economy. If agriculture is excluded, 
the evolution is even more notable. 
The reduction of employment both in the Non-financial Public 
Enterprises (minus four per cent) and in those in which the 
State participates (minus five per cent) was particularly 
notable; this kind of evolution was stopped by the stabi-
lization of the financial Public Enterprises (Chart III). 
The closing of some companies, the sale of others, together 
with some economic difficulties, explain this evolution 
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which was less grievious than expected, due to various fac-
tors. These factors include the strategy of the unions, 
yielding in negotiations for salary increases to avoid the 
licensing of workers, as well as a State subsidy policy for 
the maintenance of working places and, in certain cases, 
avoiding bankruptcies. 
There were, however, frequent cases of companies delaying 
payment of salaries; situations in which there would have 
been unemployment in an economic situation of pure compe-
tition were disguised by shorter working hours and in which 
unemployment was simply hidden were also frequent at this 
time. 
It should be noted that the State Company Sector, although 
including sectors which are basically capital-intensive, 
also had a policy of maintaining work places or reducing 
them, whenever necessary, through retirement of its 
employees. For example, during this period, the State held 
holding company for State participation ("IPE") initiated a 
policy of sale of some shares. 
In analysing the above mentioned factors, a rise in 
productivity must be noted. Various groups, for example, 
the case of the Non-financial Public Enterprises, show a 
different evolution of GVA and GVP, which showed increases, 
and of GFFC and employment, which showed decreases. 
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Special reference must be made to the holding group of State 
participation "IPE - Instituto das Participações do Esta-
do," because of the number of companies it controls, its 
qualitative importance, and its weight in the national 
economy (See Charts IV and V). 
It must be noted, however, that a large part of the State 
participation still occurs through Public Enterprises. 
In 1985, the whole of the IPE group approximately three per 
cent of the GVA and GFFC controlled almost five per cent of 
the total exports from the country and employed less than 
two per cent of the non self-employed work force (Chart V). 
From 1983 to 1985, some loss in the weight of all indices 
was registered. Only companies in which the State is a 
majority participant are being considered for the purposes 
of global calculation; data concerning the volume of 
turnover, exports, investment, cash-flow, GVA and employment 
can be found in Chart IV. 
Today, the IPE is a company with Publicly held capital, 
its corporate capital being shared by the State (Treasury), 
the Social Security Administration and some Public 
Enterprises. 
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During this period, the holding was a paradigm of what 
happened in· companies in which the State was a majority 
holder, as some sales and restructuring were made with the 
objective of improving the financial and economic situation 
of some companies. 
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1983 
1984 
1985 κ 
1983 
1984 
1985 . 
1983 
1984 
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1983 
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1985 ι 
1983 
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a) 
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71 094 
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2.2..In Spain 
Both the evolution of the Public Enterprises and their con-
tribution to the Spanish economy are to be quantified, for 
the years of 1984 and 1985, in terms of National Accounting. 
The State Company Sector includes the entities (depending on 
the Central Administration) which participate in Non-
financial activities, including the Autonomous Commercial or 
Industrial Entities (0. A. C. I. S.), the Public entities 
and Companies with a majority Public participation or, in 
the case of minority participation, when political control 
by the State exists (Cf. Annex 2, Lists 1 and 2). 
The evaluation of the contribution of the Non-financial 
State Company Sector in the Spanish economy was considered 
in terms of Gross Value Added at market prices (GVA m.p.), 
payment of workers, Gross Formation of Fixed Capital and 
Employment. 
If the GVA pm is used as a basic index, both taxes on Tobac-
co and Petroleum products and taxes on the use of telephone, 
increasing the value of production must be considered. 
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The amounts corresponding to these products are, in millions 
of Spanish "pesetas: 
1985 1986 
Petroleum income 
Tobacco income 
Stamp income 
Telephone "canon" 
Taxes on Petroleum 
Taxes on Tobacco 
Taxes on Telephones 
100,036 
33,013 
97,191 
23,435 
385,901 
90,566 
64,233 
82,866 
28,693 
91,499 
20,846 
364,781 
78,991 
58,533 
In 1985, the Non-financial Public Enterprises represented, 
based on the data on Chart VI, 9.2 per cent of the Gross In-
ternal Product, 16 per cent of the Gross Formation of Fixed 
Capital and 4.6 per cent of Employment, the last percentage 
increasing to 5.5 per cent if agriculture is excluded. 
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The participation of the State Enterprises increased during 
the years under .discussion, from 7.8 per cent of the Gross 
Internal Product in 1983 to 9.2 per cent in 1985. 
The Value Added by the Public Enterprises grew at a cumula-
tive annual rate of 23 per cent, which was greater than the 
rate of the national economy, at 11 per cent (Chart VI). 
For the entirety of the EEC countries, the GVA of the Public 
Enterprises was of 30 per cent in 1983. These figures show 
that the importance of the Public Enterprises in the nation-
al economies of the EEC Member-States is greater than the 
same figures referred to in Spain. 
According to said chart, the most important contributions 
are: Commerce, Communication, Electrical Energy, Gas, Steam 
and Water, Petroleum and Natural Gas. 
Based on employment, the most relevant sectors are 
Communication and Transportation. 
Employment in Public Enterprises represents almost five per 
cent of the total employment in the national economy. 
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3. Portuguese and Spanish Institutions which are part of 
the EEC concept of Public Enterprises 
After analysing the different legal concepts of Public En-
terprises in the two countries under discussion and men-
tioning their weight in both economies in the introduction, 
the creation and development of the entirety of State con-
trolled companies in the Iberian penninsula must be ex-
plained. This explanation concludes with a "listing" 
identifying those companies fitting into the selected 
operative concept of Public Enterprises, i. e. the EEC 
concept (Cf. Annexes 1 and 2). 
3.1. Creation and Development of the Entirety of 
Public Enterprises in Portugal 
A long term favorable trend toward state control of 
productive services can be seen in Portugal. 
Examples of this trend are to be found in the "Casa da 
India" (House of India), which in 1506 had the monopoly of 
commerce with the Orient or in the Commercial Companies 
(Companhias Comerciais) which proliferated in Portugal in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The centuries old 
"Fábrica de Vidros da Marinha Grande" (whose name was later 
changed to "Fábrica-Escola dos Irmãos Stephens") and the 
"Fábrica Nacional" da Cordoaria," which are notable for their 
age, became connected with the tobacco and match monopolies 
as well as the State Railway companies at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. 
By the beginning of the 1870s, the State already exercised a 
diversified business activity. 
There was an explosive fever of nationalizations after the 
April 1974 Revolution which reached its heighth at the 
zenith of the so-called "Gonçalvismo," during the preconsti-
tutional period of 1975 - 1976. The State was forced to 
intervene actively, assuming the risk of management, in 
fundamental sectors of economy, serving the political 
project of radical modification of the economic structure. 
In illustrati on : 
- Issuing Banks (Decrees-Law NQ 450/74, 451/74 and 
452/74, of September 13); 
- Banking institutions and other monetary and financial 
entities (Decree-Law NQ 132-A/75, of March 14 and 
Decree-Law NQ 561/75, of October 02); 
- Insurance companies (Decree-Law NQ 135-A/75, of March 
15); 
- Ironworks (Decree-Law NQ 20.5-F/85, of April 16); 
- Production, transportation and distribution of 
electricity (Decree-Law NQ 205-A/75, of April 16); 
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- Refining and distribution of petroleum products 
(Decree-Law NQ 205-A/75, of April 16); 
- Cement industry (Decree-Lei NQ 221-A/75, of May 09); 
- Cellulose (Decree-Law NQ 221-B/75, of May 09); 
- Glass industry (Decree-Law NQ 432/75, of August 13); 
- Mining industries (Decree-Law NQ 434/75, of August 14); 
- Food industries (Decree-Law NQ 474/75, of August 30); 
- Ship building and repairing (Decree-Law NQ 478/75, of 
September 01); 
- Agriculture, forestry and cattle breeding (Decree-Law 
NQ 407-A/75, of July 30); 
- Radio, television, and related activities (Decrees-Law 
ΝΩ 674-C/75 and 674-D/75, of December 02); 
- Fishing and related activities (Decree-Law NQ 572/76, 
of July 20); 
- Graphic arts and publishing industry (Decree-Law NQ 
639/76, of July 29). 
Legislators expressly named the companies to be national­
ized, at the same time coersively transferring all the pat­
rimony of the identified companies (assets and liabilities) 
to the State and abolishing said companies "ipso jure." 
Sometimes nationalization of part of the capital occurred, 
for example with respect the share held by foreign investors 
(examples: Decree-Law NQ 205/75, of April 16 as concerns the 
"Soponata"; Decree-Law NQ 228-A/75, of May 13 as concerns 
the "Empresa Madeirense de Tabacos"; Decree-Law NQ 432/75, 
of August 14 as concerns the "Pirites Alentejanas" and 
Decree-Law NQ 502/76, of June 30 as concerns the "Carris"). 
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Other nationalizations of property occurred without af­
fecting the' legal­ existence of the companies to which the 
property had belonged. This was also the case of the 
establishment of production and distribution of electricity 
which had belonged to other companies with other corporate 
objectives (Decree­Law NQ 205/75, of April 16 and Decree­Law 
NQ 502/76, of June 30). 
Following these nationalizations, a uniform basic legal 
regulation which defined Public Enterprises and regulated 
their creation and operation became necessary; thus the 
publication of said Decree­Law NQ 260/76, of April 08. 
Following the nationalizations, the rapidly expanded 
entirety of Public Enterprises changed in some ways: 
a) Public Services and Establishments, which had previ­
ously been integrated into, or dependent on, Public 
Administration, were transformed into the legal form 
of Public Enterprises (For example, "ΑΝΑ/EP," created 
by Decree­Law NQ 122/77, of March 31, through trans­
ferring one part of the services which had previously 
been part of the Direcção­Geral da Aeronáutica Civil; 
"INDEP," created by Decree­Law NQ 515/80, of October 
31, from the factories of the Army; "Dragapor," 
* 
created by Decree­Law NQ 332/77, of August 10 which 
assumed the functions of the latter Direcção­Geral de 
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Portos and Administração-Geral do Porto de Lisboa); 
b) Creation "ex-novo" of organizations to provide for new 
needs (example: "IPE", "FINANGESTE", "ENATUR"); 
c) The restructuring or reorganization of the national-
ized sector, with numerous examples. That was the 
case with "QUIMIGAL, EP" created by Decree-Law NQ 
530/77, of December 30, from the merger of three 
nationalized companies: the "Sociedade Portuguesa de 
Petroquímica, SARL", the "Amoníaco Português, SARL" 
and the "Nitratos de Portugal, SARL"; as well as with 
the "Empresa Mineira e Metalúrgica, EP-(EMMA)" created 
by Decree-Law NQ 510/79, of December 24, from the 
previously nationalized company "Sociedade Mineira de 
Santiago, SARL"; "SOCARMAR, EP", created by Decree-
Regulation NQ 57/77, of August 25, from the nation-
alized company "Sociedade de Cargas e Descargas 
Marítimas, SARL"; the "Estaleiros Navais de Viana do 
Castelo, EP (ENVC ) " created by Decree-Law NQ 850/76, 
of December 17, from the nationalized company 
"Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo, SARL"; and the 
"EDM -- Empresa de Desenvolvimento Mineiro" created by 
Decree-Law NQ 185/82, of May 06, from the merger of 
the former Public Enterprises "EDMA" and "Ferrominas"; 
credit institutes created from the nationalized banks 
and the insurance companies resulting from the 
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nationalized insurance companies (Cf. Annex 1). 
Presently, the trend is opposite that exibited during the 
last decade, with a noticeable movement against the increase 
of the State Company Sector. 
Thus, a wave of repri vatization is expected in the short or 
medium term, following the Program of the present Government 
which has indicated that three bills for authorization of 
the reprivatization process are to be handed to the Assem-
bleia da República (Parliament). Repri vatization is to oc-
cur through the conversion of Public Enterprises into Public 
Limited Companies with mixed funds and through the regula-
tion of sale, exchange or donation as payment, of the patri-
mony of Public Enterprises. A new law on the sale of State 
participations or of other public entities is also expected. 
There is, in addition to the strong stake of the new Portu-
guese Government (to be studied in the last chapter): 
- the opening to private enterprise of sectors which were 
previously prohibited to it, following Decree-Law NQ 
406/83, of November 19 (fertilizer and cement in-
dustries, banks and insurance companies); 
« 
- a certain dismantling of the State Company Sector, that 
has taken place in the last few years, translated, for 
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example, into: 
a) "ANOP -- Agência Noticiosa Portuguesa, EP," created 
by Decree-Law NQ 330/75, of July 01, was abolished 
by Decree-Law NQ 432-A/86, of December 23, and is in 
the process of being liquidated. Its functions were 
transferred to the cooperative "Agência Lusa de 
Informação"; 
b) "FRIGARVE," created from the nationalization of the 
non-State owned shares of capital in "Frigarve --
Empresa Frigorífica do Algarve, Limitada," which 
operated as a result of Decree-Law NQ-572/76, of 
July 20, which was abolished by Decree-Law NQ 
307/84, of September 19. It is in the process of 
being liquidated. 
c) "CNN -- Companhia Nacional de Navegação, EP," which 
resulted from the nationalization of the CNN --
Companhia Nacional de Navegação, SARL" through 
Decree-Law NQ 205-C/75, of April 16, was abolished 
through Decree-Law NQ 138/85, of May 03, and is in 
the process of being liquidated. 
d) "CTM -- Companhia de Transportes Marítimos, EP," 
whose statutes were approved by Decree-Law NQ 
484/77, of November 16, following the nationali-
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zation of "CTM - SARL." The former was later abol-
ished by Decree-Law NQ 137/85 of May 03, and is in 
the process of liquidation. The maritime activities 
of CTM were transferred to "Transinsular" and 
"Portline." Transinsular made a public offer of 
sale of stock (OPV) to disseminate part of the 
corporate capital and has requested admission to 
the Lisbon Bourse; 
e) "CPP — Companhia Portuguesa de Pescas," created by 
Decree-Law NQ 572/76, of July 20, which resulted 
from the nationalization of the shares of "CPP -
SARL," not belonging to the State, was abolished by 
Decree-Law NQ 139/84 of May 07, and is in the 
process of being liquidated. 
f) "DRAGAPOR — Dragagens de Portugal, EP," created by 
Decree-Law NQ 332/77, of August 10, was transformed 
into a corporation; 
g) "SNAPA — Sociedade Nacional dos Armadores de Pesca 
de Arrasto," created by Decree-Law NQ 572/76, of 
July 20, which nationalized "SNAPA - SARL," was 
abolished by Decree-Law NQ 161/82, of May 07, and is 
in the process of liquidation; 
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h) "EPPI - Empresa Pública dos Parques Industrias," 
created by Decree-Law NQ 133/73, of March 28, was 
abolished by Decree-Law NQ 39/86, of March 04, and 
is in the process of liquidation; 
i) "GELMAR - Empresa Distribuidora de Produtos 
Alimentares," created following the nationalization 
of shares of "GELMAR, Lda." by Decree-Law NQ 572/76, 
was abolished by Decree-Law NQ 57-D/84, of February 
20, and is in the process of being liquidated; 
j) "PESCRUL -- Sociedade de Pesca de Crustáceos," which 
resulted from nationalization of the shares of the 
"PESCRUL, SARL" by Decree-Law NQ 572/75, saw the 
State's share of participation transferred to "IPE" 
holding by Decree-Law NQ 294/86, of September 19. 
3.2. Creation and Development of the Entirety of 
Public Enterprises in Spain 
The antecedents of the Public Enterprises in Spain go back 
to the eighteenth century, with the organization of the Post 
Office as a Public Service, although royal monopolies, such 
institutions as the "Companhias Coloniais" (Colonial Com-
panies) which maintained commerce with the Indies and 
Royal factories previously existed as public companies. 
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In the nineteenth- century some Public Enterprises, in the 
mining and forestry sectors, were created or consolidated, 
the latter, for example, having been integrated into the 
forests owned by the State. 
In this century, the Royal Decree Law of June 28, 1927, 
created the Petroleum Monopoly, with fiscal, social and 
economic aims. 
There was economic intervention especially after 1939, 
immediately following the civil war. 
The Spanish economic situation resulting from this conflict 
(1936 - 1939), and the conditions imposed by the interna-
tional context of the time, forced the State to adopt an 
autarkic formula in industrial management. 
The most important interventionist decisions from this era 
of economic autarky, which were in force until the 
Stabilization Plan of 1959, were the creation of the 
"Instituto Nacional de Industria" (INI) and the "Red 
Nacional de Ferrocarriles Españoles" (RENFE). 
The Law of September 25, 1941 created the INI as a public 
law entity established independently of the Government with 
the aim of developing and financing the creation and 
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resurgence of the national industry. 
The INI does not directly produce, but functions in legal 
and economic aspects, as a "trust" of producing companies. 
The latter adopt the legal status of Public Limited 
Companies and are regulated by commercial law. 
The Law of January 24, 1941 which created the "RENFE," how-
ever, defined the conditions for redemption of the normal 
rail lines, which were leased on concession by private 
compani es. 
Since 1959, while the Stabilization Plan was -still in force, 
a process of liberalization of the Spanish economy began, 
demanding from the Public Enterprises the effort of adapting 
to the competitive demands of systems with a free market 
economy. The Law of the Autonomous State Entities, of De-
cember 26, 1958, defines the so-called "Empresas Nacionais 
(National Companies)" together with the Autonomous Entities 
and the administrative services without legal personality as 
types which are part of the vast concept of Autonomous State 
Enti ti es. 
In 1962 there was a return to interventionism. As a conse-
quence of the publication of the Law for the Regulation of 
Credit and Banks, of 1962, the Bank of Spain is nationalized 
and the "Instituto de Médio e Longo Prazo" (Institute for 
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Medium and Long Term) (today "Instituto de Crédito Oficial" 
- Institute for Official Credit) was created. 
Later, the 1962 Law on the Patrimony of the State came to 
regulate the companies held by INI and, following this law, 
the "Direcção-Geral do Património do Estado" (General-
Direction for the Patrimony of the State) was created, de-
pendent on the Ministry of Finance, and having patrimonial 
and financial control over entities belonging to the State. 
This department functions as a holding company, although it 
is not formally one, due to lack of legal personality. 
Among the companies it administers, thè most 'important are 
the "Compañía Telefonica Nacional de España," the "Compañía 
Arrendataria de Monopolios de Tabacos" and the "Banco 
Exterior de España." The last-named is one of the largest 
and most profitable companies in the country. 
In 1981, the "Instituto Nacional de Hidrocarburos" was 
created, which operates as a holding company for more than 
fifty companies in the area of hydrocarburetants. 
Companies held by this group are in all the areas of 
activity of the sector: 
Extraction and Production: "Hispanoil"; 
Refining of petroleum and petrochemical industry 
"Empetro!" and "Alcudia"; 
- Distribution and commercialization: "Campsa," "Butano' 
and "Enagas." 
In January 1985, the "Red Electrica de España (REDESA)" was 
created and charged with the high tension network. Since 
that time, however, a certain process of privatization has 
been initiated, with liquidations of the following INI 
holding investments: 
- The "SECOINSA" was sold to the "Compañía Telefonica 
Nacional de España", on March 13, 1985; 
- The "S. K. F. Española" was sold on July 29, 1985; 
- The "Viajes Marsans" has been acquired by the "Trapsa" 
group; 
- The sale of "SEAT" to "Volkswagen" was negotiated, the 
sale having been concluded during 1986. 
The present situation of the State Company Sector in Spain 
is completely expressed in Annex 2, where there is a list of 
Spanish Public Enterprises and their addresses. 
4. Organization of the Control of Public Enterprises 
The institutional structure and the methods of control are 
different in Portugal and Spain, with extreme differences 
in the Portuguese case depending on the legal form which the 
State controlled company has in terms of Portuguese legisla-
64 
tion. Thus, the method of description used for Portugal in 
point 4.1., makes no sense in the Spanish case. 
4.1. In Portugal 
The organic and functional structure and the context and 
objectives of the control exercised by the Public Authori-
ties vary greatly in Portugal, depending on whether Public 
Enterprises are considered "stricto sensu," subject to a 
general statute; or considered to be public capital com-
panies or companies in which the State participates. 
4.1.1. General Framework 
For the purposes of defining the general Regulatory frame-
work of the State controlled companies in Portugal, those 
having the legal status of Public Enterprises must be dis-
tinguished from the others. 
As concerns Public Enterprises "stricto sensu," Article 3 of 
Decree-Law NQ 260/76 provides that they are ruled by: 
- a common general basis (Decree-Law NQ 260/76); 
- their own statutes (approved by decree or by decree-
law); 
- private law (commercial law and, secondarily, civil 
1 aw).. 
Individual and collective labor law is also applicable to 
Public Enterprises as concerns labor questions (Article 30 
of Decree-Law NQ 260/76). Common fiscal law (Article 34 of 
said document) is also applicable. 
Companies with publicly held capital or in which the State 
participates have no specific legal status to regulate them. 
Article 48 of Decree-Law NQ 260/76' expressly provides that 
the General Basis of Public Enterprises do not apply to the 
previously mentioned companies. Thus, they are subject to 
the common regime of private law, although their statutes 
may show the influence of politics or of the State's own 
i nterests. 
The Regulatory framework in which Public Enterprises move 
having been defined, an inventory of all existing legal 
provisions or administrative practices that might directly 
or indirectly condition the establishement of private 
companies must be made, always bearing in mind the diffi-
culty of a global diagnosis of possible discrimination, 
because : 
a) there are obligations which are exclusively reserved 
to Public Enterprises, due to State interest impera-
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tives or to lack of interest or lack of aptitude on 
the part of private enterprise; 
b) management restrictions and obligations, specific to 
the public sector are numerous; however, 
c) objectively non-discriminatory rules or measures which 
can be translated into true discrimination when seen 
in the context of a sectorial analysis. 
Due to their generic range and economic importance, the 
complex financial relations existing between the State and 
Public Enterprises (subsidies to operation, capital dona-
tions, loans with privileged financial conditions, no-return 
or insufficient return on invested capitals, guarantees for 
financing, etc.) must be noted. 
A complete inventory and quantification of all these finan-
cial instruments is impossible because most of them are of 
restricted use and vary from sector to sector, or even from 
company to company within the same sector. Consultation of 
published fiscal information concerning amounts proposed for 
distribution as compensation, as non-refundable subsidies, 
as donations of statutory capital and for investment and 
financial improvement as registered in the Budgets of the 
State is necessary (1985, 1986 and 1987). Published fiscal 
information should also be consulted for the division cri-
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teria among the Public Enterprises and companies in which 
the State participates, as provided for by the Council of 
Ministers (Cf. Diário da República, II series: NQ 202, Sep-
tember 03, 1985; NQ 174, July 31, 1986 and NQ 111, May 15, 
1987, of which copies are attached. See Annexes 3, 4 and 5). 
Finally, as concerns administrative practices, attention 
must be called to the fact that it is not possible to find a 
well defined line of orientation as concerns (discrimina-
tory) protection given by the State to Public Enterprises. 
There are two specific examples of large Public Enterprises: 
"QUIMIGAL" and "PORTUCEL." 
In the first case, State protection is obvious and the Ad-
ministration, in exercising protection, makes use of many 
different subterfuges, including non-observance of the 
provisions of Article 204, NQ 1 of the Act of Accession, 
where competitors of "QUIMIGAL" are concerned, or the main-
tenance of several entities, such as the "Comissão Regula-
dora de Produtos Químicos e Farmacêuticos" (Regulatory Com-
mission for Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals) or "Commissão de 
Explosivos" (Explosive Commission), whose present real func-
tion is to avoid competition instead exercising its true 
function. 
« 
"PORTUCEL", on the contrary, is a very profitable Public 
Enterprise with great commercial potential. The State has 
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taken discriminatory actions including those which strongly 
prejudice "PORTUCEL" in the market. For instance, the State 
has forced this company to charter ships owned by other Pub-
lic Enterprises, as a way of protecting the latter, when 
other more competitive freight rates were offered for the 
transport of imported raw materials or for the shipping of 
the products it exports. 
The State maintains several other entities, in the same way. 
They include, the "Instituto dos Produtos Florestais" 
(Institute for Forestry Products) and the "Comissão Regula-
dora dos Produtos Químicos e Farmacêuticos" (Regulatory 
Commission for Chemical and Pharmaceutical Products), which 
assess taxes contrary to the provisions of Article 193 of 
the Act of Accession and whose collection affect not only 
community exporters but also national producers, including 
such Public Enterprises as "PORTUCEL." In many cases, 
revenues obtained serve exclusively to maintain the 
collecting entities which occasionally exercise 
administrative practices in the market which are directly 
dictated by the State or through its longa manus of which 
Public Enterprises are indirectly part. 
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4.1.2. Control of Public Enterprises "Stricto 
Sensu" 
The law (Decree-Law NQ 260/76) provides a system of double 
economic and financial control, with the Minister responsi-
ble for the sector of economic activity in which the Public 
Enterprise principally or exclusively operates (Minister in 
charge of Control) and the Minister of Finance sharing 
responsi bi 1 i ty. 
The last changes in the legal framework of relations of the 
State with the Public Enterprises, resulted from Decree-Law 
NQ 29/84, of January 20. This Decree-Law aimed to give more 
autonomy to the management of said companies, reducing the 
number of acts for which permission was necessary. 
Actual practice has shown a large scale transfer in the 
controlling duties to the Ministry of Finance — which has 
improved the action of its technical entity, the "Inspec-
ção-Geral das Finanças" — and the recently created (by 
Decree-Law NQ 99/87, of March 05) "Gabinete para a Análise 
do Financiamento do Estad·* e das Empresas Públicas, GAFEEP," 
which provides a specialized staff. 
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4.1.3. Control of Companies with State held 
capital 
Companies with publicly held capital are organized in the 
legal form of companies, generally public limited compan-
ies, whose capital belongs entirely to public entities: 
State / Treasury, Public Enterprises and other entities of 
public law. 
The legal framework of the relationship between the State 
and these companies basically regulates how the representa-
tives of the shareholders act in the General Meetings of the 
Compani es : 
- In the definition of objectives and general policies; 
- Electing members of the management and control boards; 
- In the control actions adopted by the company. 
Anticipating that the role of the State-shareholder is 
exercised through the normal ways and means provided by 
company law, the legal means is shown to be more decentral-
ized and simplified than the regime in force for Public 
Enterprises. This gives the companies in which the State 
participates a higher degree of autonomy and management 
flexibility than the former. 
When characterizing the institutional model of powers and 
competencies in this kind of company, attention must be 
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called to the case of the "IPE -- Instituto das Participa-
ções do Es'tado, -SA" which is highly representative, both 
due to its genuine form of company with publicly held 
capital, and its importance in the context of the State 
Company Sector. 
The State / Treasury holds the majority (approximately 
eighty per cent) of the corporate capital in IPE, a 
"holding" which, besides the management of its portfolio of 
shares, has the aim of promoting both the creation of new 
companies and new business enterprises. 
Legally (Decree-Law NQ 330/82, of August 18), the interven-
tion of the State in the IPE occurs via the person nominated 
by the Ministry of Finance as representative in the General 
Meeti ng. 
4.1.4. Control of Companies in which the State 
partici pates 
There is no legal definition for companies in which the 
State participates, although Article 48, par. 1 of Decree-
Law NQ 260/76 calls them "'companies of mixed economy' as 
those created according to commercial law in which public 
and private national and foreign capital are associated." 
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In summary: these are companies in which capital is divided 
among public and private entities, the capital component 
belongi ng: 
Directly to the State or other public entities, 
including Public Enterprises (direct participation); or 
To companies in which the above entities participate 
(indirect participation of first and second degrees). 
Having a legal form provided by commercial law, they have 
the status of public companies limited by shares, or of pri-
vate limited companies. The legal intervention of the 
shareholders occurs via the representation in General 
Meetings, in terms of the powers conferred by· proportion of 
capital held. 
Generally, only the ownership of the majority of capital 
(over fifty per cent) gives the possibility of controlling 
or dominating the company. It may, however, happen that a 
public entity holds the majority by itself, but that the 
group of public entities holds the majority and, through 
coordinate action, it can exercise the control. 
In indirect participation of first and second degree, the 
power of the State to interfere is conditioned by the power 
it exercises in the companies in which it holds a majority 
participation and is, in principle, weakened. We will try 
to characterize the situation concerning direct participa-
73 
tion with emphasis on the participations held by: 
- The State ["Direcção-Geral do Tesouro" (Directorate-
General of the Treasury)]; 
- "IPE -- Investimentos e Participações do Estado"; and 
- Public Enterprises. 
a) Participation by the State (Directorate-General of the 
Treasury) 
Majority participation concerns companies in which State 
intervention is basically the same in force for the Public 
Enterprises. 
As concerns other participation, intervention is limited, 
generally, to the nomination of representatives of the State 
in General Meetings and in the Administration, which ever 
the case. 
b) Participation by "IPE - Instituto das Participações 
do Estado" (Institute for Participation by the State) 
On December 31, 1986, IPE held shares in 95 companies, 
including 3 in which it held 100 per cent, 20 in which it 
held over 90 per cent and 45 in which it held over 50 per 
cent. 
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For the exercise of its duties as shareholder, IPE created 
and maintatns its own structure. 
c) Participation by Public Enterprises 
In general, the most relevant participation by Public Enter-
prises has a certain integrating or complementary logic in 
its activity. Thus intervention as shareholders has to be 
coordinated with company activities. 
4.2. In Spain 
4.2.1. Institutional Dependence of Public 
Enterpri ses 
The previously mentioned triple distinction of the Portu-
guese case is not applicable to Spain. Thus, it seems con-
venient to group companies according to institutional 
dependence and legal form adopted for better comprehension 
of the way control is exercised: 
Companies controlled by the "Instituto Nacional de 
Industri a -- INI"; 
Companies controlled by the "Instituto Nacional de 
Hidrocarburantes — INH"; 
- Companies controlled by the Ministry of Economy 
("Economia y.Hacienda") through its Directorate-General 
of the State Patrimony. 
Companies included in these groups adopt the legal form of 
public company limited by shares, i. e., companies of pri-
vate law, as provided by Article 6 of the General Law of 
Budget of January 04, 1977, which provides that State 
Companies are ruled by private law norms (commercial, civil 
and labor) except when otherwise provided. 
a) Companies controlled by the "Instituto Nacional de 
Industria" (National Institute of<Industry) 
The INI operates in the following sectors: electricity, 
ironworks, mining, defense, shipbuilding, equipment, alu-
minium, food, electronics and data processing, fertilizer, 
air transportation, maritime transportation, engineering and 
construction, industrial promotion, external commerce and 
finance. In 1985, there were 64 companies with a majority 
direct participation by the INI. Through its companies, the 
INI indirectly has a fifty per cent or greater capital 
holding in 170 companies. 
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b) Companies controlled by the "Instituto Nacional de 
Hidrocarburantes" (National Institute of Hydro-
carburetants) 
The INH has direct and majority participation in five 
companies: "HISPANOIL," "EMPETROL," "CAMPSA," "BUTANO" and 
"ENAGAS." Through these companies the INH is a majority 
participant in 216 companies. 
c) Companies Dependent on the Patrimony of the State. 
The group of companies included in this institutional group 
is particularly heterogeneous as concerns its activities. 
On one hand, there are industrial units including "INTEL-
HOUSE" and "Minas de Almadén" and, on the other hand, there 
are services including "Transmediterranea" and "EFE Agency." 
It also includes a fiscal monopoly, the "Tabacalera," as 
well as the "Compañía Telefonica Nacional de España." In the 
latter, the State is a minority participant but, as the re-
maining shares are held by many private shareholders, the 
Ministry of Economy maintains decisive control over the 
company, through a deputy of the Government who, along with 
the representatives of the Council, guarantee the accom-
plishment of State goals. 
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The Directorate-General of the Patrimony of the State has a 
direct and majority participation in 26 companies and an 
indirect and minority participation in 13 more companies. 
d) Entities of Public Law 
Included are, in the existing eleven 
- "RENFE (Red Nacional de Ferrocarriles Españoles)"; 
- "FEVE (Ferrocarril de Vila Estrecha)"; 
- "Puerto Autónomo de Barcelona"; 
- "Puerto Autónomo de Bilbao"; 
- "Puerto Autónomo de Huelva"; 
- "Puerto Autónomo de Valencia"; 
- "SEPES (Sociedad Estatal de Promoción y' Equipamiento 
del Suelo)"; 
- "INH (Instituto Nacional de Hidrocarburos)"; 
- "Patrimonio Nacional." 
e) Autonomous Organizations 
Integrated into this group are the "INI - Instituto Nacional 
de Industria," hidrographic confederations, the "Editora 
Nacional," the "Juntas" of the ports and the whole of 
companies in which the majority consists of "patronatos de 
viviendas" which are not specifically Public Enterprises. 
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f) Commercial Services 
This concerns only the Post and Telegraph services 
In conclusion, attention must be called to the fact that 
Public Enterprises depending on Local Administration exist, 
for example, municipal urban transportation companies. 
4.2.2. Exercise of Control 
Spanish Public Enterprises are subject'both to internal 
control within each management group with the aim of im-
proving performance and to external control exercised by the 
"Intervención General de la Administración del Estado," by 
the "Tribunal de Contas" (Auditing Office) and by the Minis-
terial Departments, in specific matters. 
The internal control of the INI and the INH consists of an 
integrated system of management planning and control, which 
is obligatory for companies in which they are direct and 
majority participants. 
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5. The Fiscal System Seen from the Point of View of the 
Policy of Competition 
In accordance with both the administrative practice of the 
Commission of the European Communities and the decisions of 
the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, the so-called fiscal in-
centives which most of the time mean momentary tax exemp-
tions or discriminations, constitute subsidies from the 
State, which are prohibited by Article 92 of the EEC Treaty 
It is from this perspective that we will list some cases of 
distortion of competition, through fiscal poilicy, in both 
Portugal and Spain. 
5.1. In Portugal 
As a rule Public Enterprises in Portugal are subject to di-
rect and indirect taxation under general terms of law, as 
provided in the law of General Basis (Articles 34 and 35 of 
Decree-Law NQ 260/76). 
This general provision is reaffirmed several times in their 
statutes. Thus, for example: 
"Agência Noticiosa Portuguesa - ANOP, EP": Decree-Law 
NQ 502/77, of November 29, Article 27, par. 1: "The 
ANOP, EP is subject to direct and indirect taxation 
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"Central de Cervejas - Centraleer, EP": Decree-Law NQ 
531/77, of December 30, Article 41: "The company is 
subject to direct and indirect taxation, under the 
terms of fiscal law." 
"Cimentos de Portugal - Cimpor, EP": Decree-Law NQ 
13/76, of March 26, Article 8, par. 1: "While a special 
tax regime is not created for Public Enterprises, the 
CIMPOR, EP, will be subject to the general tax regime 
for compani es." 
"Companhia das Lezírias, EP": Decree-Law NQ 123/78, of 
November 15, Article 40: "The CL, EP, will be subject 
to direct and indirect taxation under the general 
terms." 
"Dragagens de Portugal - DRAGAPOR, EP": Decree-Law NQ 
332/72, of August 10, Article 29: "The company will be 
subject to direct and indirect taxation under the terms 
of general 1 aw." 
Thus, tax policy frequently includes tax benefits and fiscal 
incentives and stimulae, and the rule of general subjection. 
Now, established regimes of fiscal decrease will be traced. 
a) Regimes of Objective Tax Exemption 
There are Public Enterprises which pursue collective in-
terests, operating in areas in which private enterprise have 
expressed a lack of interest. The process used to benefit 
these companies has generally been that of establishing ex-
emptions related to the activity in which they operate. One 
must, however, distinguish between exemptions provided for 
in general tax laws and those provided for in special laws. 
- fì 
i) Provided for in general tax laws: companies with a con-
cession for the production, transportation and large scale 
distribution of electrical energy have always been exempt 
from "Contribuição Industrial (corporate tax)" as provided 
in Article 14, par. 16, of the Code. Most of these com-
panies were nationalized by Decree-Law NQ 205-G/75 and, from 
this group came some Public Enterprises -- EDP, EP (Decree-
Law NQ 520/76, of June 30) and the "Empresa de Electricidade 
dos Açores, EDA, EP" (Regional Regulatory Decree NQ 34/81-A, 
of July 18 -- formerly "Empresa Insular de Electricidade, 
SARL" ) . 
It seems obvious that, due to the objective nature of the 
exemption (independent of the quality of the beneficiary), 
these companies will still be exempt from corporate tax. 
In the case of "Empresa de Electricidade da Madeira, EP," 
the solution, although obtained in another way, is the same. 
Decree-Law NQ 12/74, of June 15, did not provide for the 
fiscal regime of this company. The interpretation of the 
Fiscal Administration was that it should be subject to the 
general provisions of Article 34 of Decree-Law NQ 260/76 and 
thus benefit from exemption to corporate tax, but only as 
concerns large scale distribution of electrical energy. 
Decree-Law NQ 30/79, of February 24, approved new statutes 
for this company, expressly approving the understanding of 
the Fiscal Administration. 
ii) Provided for in special laws: There is also another type 
of situation in which fiscal benefits were the result of 
special laws and, in some cases, created "ex novo" following 
the institutionalization of the Public Enterprise. 
This situation occurs in some Public Enterprises which have 
the concession of operating public services. In adminis-
trative contracts of concession of public services, the 
contractor is conferred the right of collecting prices or 
fees as remuneration for services rendered in the regime of 
concession. Said prices are predetermined by contract in 
some cases; they do not obey market laws and cannot be 
altered unilaterally by the contracting Public Enterprise. 
See Article 13, (c), Decree-Law NQ 260/76: The control 
includes the power of authorizing or approving "the prices 
or fees of companies operating public services or exercising 
their activity on an exclusive basis." 
In the face of this concept of revenue, which does not keep 
pace with costs, concession contracts or the law have to 
provide for a financial equilibrium of said contracting 
companies, which certainly includes tax exemptions. 
As concerns the "Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses -- CP, EP" 
for example, Article 7 of Decree-Law NQ109/77, has remained 
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in force via Base XXIX of Decree-Law NQ 104/73, of March 13, 
in which was stipulated that a company would continue to 
have complete State and local tax exemption throughout the 
period of the contract of concession, both general and 
specific, as well as extraordinary." 
The same can be said as concerns "CTT/TLP." The "Anglo-
Portuguese Telephone Company, Ltd," had the telephone con-
cession in Lisbon and Porto, benefitting from various tax 
exemptions anticipated in Decree-Law NQ 46 044, of November 
14, 1964. When the concession was terminated in 1967, 
Decree-Law NQ 48007, of October 26 of that year, created the 
Public Enterprise "TLP," maintaining the previous fiscal 
benefits (Article 1, par. 1). Beginning in 1970, by force 
of Decree-Law NQ 49368, of November 10, 1969, the former 
Administração Geral dos Correios Telégrafos e Telefones was 
integrated into a new Public Enterprise called "Correios e 
Telecomunicações de Portugal — CTT," whose administration 
then took over management of "TLP." Thus, there are two 
distinct companies with a common administration. 
In the same way, Annex I, Article 57Q, par. 2, (e) of 
Decree-Law NQ 49369 anticipated the full exemption of CTT 
from taxes and fees. 
* 
At present, CTT/TLP - EP, continues to benefit from these 
fiscal benefits which have always remained in force. 
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In addition to these cases, there are still Public Enter-
prises which received benefits "ex novo." 
Thus, for example, the Public Enterprise "Aeroportos e Nave-
gação Aérea - ANA, EP," created by Decree-Law NQ 122/77 of 
March 1931, is subject to a special fiscal regime through 
"exemption from payment of all taxes and fees on systems of 
equipment, tools and spare parts relating to airport ser-
vices due to the State..." (Article 32Q, par. 2, of the 
Statutes). 
Also Law NQ 75/79 ["Lei da Radiotelevisão (Television 
Law)"] designated fiscal exemptions to the benefit of 
"Radiotelevisão Portuguesa — RTP, EP" in Article 48. 
Other examples still exist which provide exemptions of a 
temporary nature, as happened in the case of "CIMPOR - EP" 
(Decree-Law NQ 217-B/76, Article 8, par. 2 - "For a three-
year period, beginning January 1976, CIMPOR will benefit 
from exemption from corporate tax..."). 
b) Regimes of Subjective Tax Exemption - the ASEFs 
It should be said, at the beginning, that there does not 
exist in the Portuguese legal system, purely subjective 
fiscal benefits i.e., there are no companies which receive 
fiscal benefits due to the simple fact of being Public 
Enterprises, without other sorts of considerations. 
Even when exemptions are attributed to this or the Public 
Enterprise, it has been the case that the major 
consideration was the company's activity. 
We cannot, perhaps, say the same as concerns.the cases 
discussed below, i.e., the benefits received by Public 
Enterprises as a result of Agreements of Economic and 
Financial Recovery (ASEFs). 
Although benefit recipients should be chosen on the basis of 
their economic and financial characteristics, in truth, the 
existence of the public quality of an enterprise is 
presupposed when such agreements are signed. Thus, the 
benefits are primarily subject i ve. 
Thus, Decree-Law NQ 353-C/77, of August 29, permitted the 
Public Enterprises to sign agreements with the State with a 
view toward reestablishment or consolidation of their 
economic and financial equilibrium. In said agreements, the 
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State is permitted to guarantee some of the benefits 
anticipated by law [Article 5Q, par. 1, line (i)]. 
These benefits were, basically, those anticipated in Law NQ 
36/77, of June 17, for private companies signing recovery 
contracts under the terms of Decree-Law NQ 124/77. Said 
benefits were extended to Public Enterprises, initially via 
Decree-Law NQ 75-A/78, whose fixed term was successively 
extended by Decree-Laws NQs 201/79 (Article 33), 183-A/80 
(Article 34), 96-A/81 (Article 29) and 119-A/83. 
Article 1 of Decree-Law NQ 126/77, of April 02, however, 
permitted the re-evaluation of fixed assets of private 
companies, which were subject to economic and financial 
recovery, were considered for tax purposes. This provision 
was extended to Public Enterprises by Decree-Law NQ 353-
B/77, of August 29, and they began, in addition, to receive 
benefits created by Law NQ 39/77 (Exemption from or 
reduction of the capital gains tax). 
Decree-Law 430/78, which followed, authorized companies 
which had not re-evaluated their assets under the terms of 
Decree-Law 126/77 to proceed with re-evaluation of not 
completely amortized fixed assets. Decree-Law NQ 219/82, of 
July 02, later permitted the re-evaluation of completei y 
* 
amortized assets. 
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In summary, the Public Enterprises which sign ASEFs receive 
some fiscal benefits as provided for in Law NQ 36/77 as well 
as benefits inherent in the réévaluation of their assets 
under the general terms of the law7. 
5.2. In Spai n 
When analysing the advantages public business activity 
receives in the fiscal area as compared to private business 
activity, we will show, following, the major exemptions or 
bonuses in the basic Spanish taxes: 
- Corporate tax; and 
- Value added tax. 
a) Corporate Tax 
This tax is regulated by Law NQ 61/78, of December 27, and 
by Royal Decree NQ 2631/82, of October 15. 
It assesses all income obtained by companies and other 
entities as defined in said tax law. 
7 An additional benefit was created by Law NQ 32/79, of 
September 07, which exempts from taxes the mergers, take-
overs and break-ups of Public Enterprises. 
After the 1987 fiscal reform, it is, along with the income 
tax on physical persons, the basis of direct taxation in 
Spai n. 
The law provides for a total exemption of Autonomous 
entities of a commercial, industrial, financial or similar 
nature. 
Additionally, there are special fiscal regimes which in an 
objective way affect companies operating in some sectors of 
activi ty. 
The most significant cases are: 
1. Mineral Companies 
The special regime consists of the so-called "dotaciones al 
factor agotamiento" and of the freedom of amortization. 
The "dotaciones al factor agotamiento" consist of endowments 
from a liability account, in relation with the profits 
gained since January 09, 1977, with the purpose of being 
considered deductible expenses in Corporate or Income Taxes, 
subject to the condition that accounted amounts be invested, 
within the next ten years, in specifically mentioned assets. 
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2. Sectors of Industrial Reconversion 
They have important fiscal benefits, which are found both in 
corporate tax and most other taxes. 
They apply indiscriminately both to companies of recon-
version which are to be created and to existing companies 
which are presently in the process of reconversion. 
The regime applies to the following sectors under recon-
version: special steels, non-brand name electric appliances, 
integral ironworks, textiles, manufacture of electrical 
equipment for automobiles, ship-building, semi-transformed 
copper products, electronic components, round common steels 
and light profiles, footwear and related industry, products 
forged by stamping and the "ITT Espana" company group. 
3. Zones of Urgent Reindustri al ization 
They consist of areas of the national territory which are 
classified by the Government, due to having been affected by 
the industrial reconversion of some sectors. 
They have some important fiscal benefits, which are not cum-
ulative with the benefits above-mentioned under point 2., 
which are given for a period of five years. 
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4. Energy Conversion 
Law NQ 82/80 provides for a series of benefits, both fiscal 
and financial, for persons and entities developing the ener-
gy savings activities which Article 1 of the Law enumerates 
5. Corporations of Regional Industrial Development of 
a Pub!i c Nature 
They have important fiscal benefits, not only as concerns 
corporate tax, but also in other taxes. 
6. "RUMASA" Group 
All companies affected by the Expropriation Law, while they 
belong to the State, will benefit from complete exemption 
from tax on capital gains resulting from its patrimonial 
regulari zation. 
7. Investigation and Exploration of Hydrocarburetants 
Those entities which are exclusively dedicated to investiga-
tion and exploration in some cases enjoy special status as 
concerns the calculation of the taxable basis (both con-
cerning revenues and expenses). 
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Other special regimes exist for co-operatives and companies 
and stock-investment funds. 
Finally, "CAMPSA," which previously functioned as a State 
organization dependent on the Ministry of Economy and Fi-
nance should be mentioned. It became a Public Enterprise as 
a result of Law NQ 45/84, of December 17, which concerned 
the reorganization of the petroleum sector. 
Beginning January 01, 1985, they lost certain tax benefits, 
such as corporate tax exemption. Previously, the State par-
ticipated in the profits of the company when they exceeded a 
certain percentage of the corporate capital (which, in fact, 
could be considered a tax on the company's profits). 
b) Value Added Tax 
As concerns indirect taxation, the creation of the VAT, on 
January 01, 1986, brought important changes to the system 
that had been in force since the 1964 Tax Reform. 
In the previous system there had been multiple exemptions 
for public activities, mainly in the area of the now abol-
ished "Imposto Geral sobre o Tráfico das Empresas (IGTE)." 
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However, the third Final Provision of Law NQ 30/85, of 
August 02 (in conjunction with Royal Decree NQ 2028/85, of 
October 30, regulate this tax) provides that "fiscal bene-
fits established previously to the enforcement of the 
present Law do not produce effects as concerns the Value 
Added Tax." 
But, the law makes an exemption as concerns public postal 
services rendered by public entities. This does not include 
telegraph and telephone services. 
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III 
ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETITION SYSTEM OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
BY SECTOR OF ACTIVITY 
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This chapter analyzes the importance of the State Company 
Sector in the Portuguese and Spanish economies, considering 
the principal sectors of activity in the two countries. 
This study has a double perspective of the evaluation of the 
relative weight of the Public Enterprises based on multiple 
economic indicators and of a diagnosis of the typology of 
competition existing in each of the sectors examined, as a 
result both of their structure and the behavior of the 
State-Entrepreneur. 
6. Analysis of the System of Competition in Portugal 
6.1. Importance of the State Company Sector in the 
Economic Sectors 
The importance of the State Company Sector is dominant in 
the principal key-sectors of the national economy: industry, 
energy, transportation, telecommunications, banking, 
insurance and services with social characteristics. 
This perspective underscores the importance of the sub-
sector of Public Enterprises, owing to the enormous impor-
tance which they assume, because the great majority of them 
are involved in activities of economic infrastructure and of 
public service and in basic industries such as chemicals, 
ironworks., cement, cellulose, and the refining and 
commercialization of petroleum. 
Consequently, predominantly capital-intensive activities are 
developed. They generate a relatively reduced number of work 
places, which, it must be said, did not prevent them from 
having an important percentage, in terms of work places in 
commercial activities, in the entirety of non-agricultural 
enterprises (Cf. Annex 1, List 7). 
We will now move to an analysis of the evolution, in the 
period from 1983 to 1985, of the sub-grouping of the non-
financial Public Enterprises, whose principal sectors of 
activity are shown are the chart following. 
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Their weight grew by 31 per cent as concerns GVA, with 
growth rates of 37 per cent in the Energy and 36 per cent in 
the Industry and Transportation Sectors. 
Although less than ten points, there was also strong growth 
in the Gross Value of Production, especially in the Industry 
and Communications sectors. 
Additionally, investment reflected the period of recession 
which affected the Portuguese economy during the period of 
this study. Behavior was not, however, the same in the sec-
tors under consideration, as Transportation had a large loss 
(minus 46 per cent), Industry stagnated and Energy and Com-
munications rose by 5 per cent and 22 per cent respectively. 
The evolution of the GFFC showed significant changes, re-
flecting measures adopted by the Government, and also felt 
the effect of the conclusion of some important investment 
projects in the areas of cellulose, cement and public works. 
However, the high investment in the glass industry helped 
lessen the losses. 
There were important drops in industrial (minus five per 
cent) and transportation (minus six per cent) employment. 
On the other hand, energy showed a favorable evolution. 
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As concerns companies in which the State is a majority 
participant8, although statistical coverage by sectors of 
activity is less reliable than in Public Enterprises, there 
is general confirmation of the same trends. 
It is important to affirm that companies included in the 
State Company Sector have a great relevance in inter-
sectorial relations, due to the existence of several sectors 
on both sides which explore activities very dependent on the 
portfolio of commissions of said companies. Said companies 
are characterized by a reasonable degree of technological 
development, as is the case of relations between Public 
Enterprises and private companies in the ironwork and 
construction and electrical equipment assembling sectors. 
Imports play an important role company activity, as 
contrasted with exports, whose role is mainly residual, as 
production, with some exceptions, is focused on the 
satisfaction of the internal market. 
The peculiarity of the Portuguese Public Enterprises of 
being included in sectors which have traditionally been 
dominated by private enterprise, some of them of fundamental 
strategic importance, should be noted. 
8 Cf. Annex 1, List 4 
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The entirety of the companies in which the State is a 
majority participant includes a large number of productive 
units and different economic activities. 
They are primarily in the light industry and the rendering 
of services sectors, although there are some notable 
exceptions, for example, in the areas of cellulose or 
highway construction in which the State is an important 
participant, in some cases having a monopoly. 
These companies are, generally small and medium sized, with 
greatly differing technology levels and impact, in terms of 
multiplicative effects, among the several sectors but which, 
in their entirety, make the possibilities of State 
intervention in economic sectors stronger. 
In their entirety, companies included in the State Company 
Sector are still at the top of the scale of the major 
industrial companies in Portugal, although to a lesser 
degree than some years ago. 
In commercial activities, the public sector has a small 
weight which is even smaller when compared to its weight in 
other sectors. There are some entities which for a long 
time have been especially charged with working as Regulatory 
instruments of the markets for certain products, and a small 
number of companies which, due to nationalization, were 
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integrated into the above-mentioned entities. 
In other areas of the tertiary sector, the weight of the 
State Company Sector is important, for example, in 
transportation, communications and certain services of a 
social nature such as health and education. 
Its influence is positively dominant in road, rail, air and 
maritime transportation as well as in communications, be-
cause the State Company Sector controls radio, television 
and telecommunications. It is also important in other sec-
tors, including cereal grains, sugar imports, and fisheries. 
As concerns Financial Public Enterprises, one must distin-
guish Credit and finance institutions from insurance 
companies, although the State is dominant in all cases. 
As shown above, however, there is a certain trend toward the 
opening of said companies to private capital. 
In the financial sector, the State controlled position is 
still nearly 80 per cent and the relative positions of the 
biggest companies have been little altered until now, al-
though a trend for major change in the future is being felt. 
The State Company Sector in general, and Public Enterprises 
in particular, have been contending with problems of dif-
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fering nature. The most important are: low profitability of 
the companies, "heavy losses, the great need for credit and 
heavy borrowing, namely external; bad management and bad 
productive investment policy, incompetent managers, based on 
criteria more political than technical in nature; too much 
governmental interference, bad human resources policy (with 
high average age and not receptive to change), deterioration 
of financial and productive structures and inadequate ad-
justment to both the national and the international economic 
evolution. 
Since it is impossible to analyze all of these problems 
within the scope of this study, problems of a financial 
nature will be briefly considered. 
There are many different situations in this area, but one of 
the main factors of distortion was heavy external borrowing 
(See Chart IX). 
C H A R T I X 
Division cf tne Po:tuCuese External Debt by 
Borrowing Sector and Types of Guarantees 
- i c l i r . s - - ^ : S t r 5 r ; v e Ssoter 
Ξ3-κ c-- »ZTi-za: 
r - r .er N'o_etarv I ' s t i t j t i o n s 
'..:- -Mo^etsr · . r ; -a" - . r ia l I n s t i t u t i o n s 
\ r ^ i - a - o i i l c . o I i c E- terpr ises 
' . . - r - F i - a - ~ i = : P r i v a t e Sector 
T : -T&L 
n--·-- c . - - : ! - - - · - = - _ - = ■ c e - u r i t y 
| 
! 
1 
r o t a i 
23 ,7 
7 ,5 
11,3 
1,1 
^ 1 n 
5.4 
i o : , G 
L,6 
1 9 6 3 
Snort 
0 , 0 
e,8 
1.8 
0 , 3 
Su,9 
4 , 2 
ι:.;-, o 
0 , 0 
0 ,3 
^ e o i „ - a-o 
31,0 
7 ,1 
U . 3 
1,4 
fcC.5 
5,7 
i o : . : · 
1 2 . ; 
3 , ? 
1 9 δ Λ 
Tota l 
25 ,6 
7 ,0 
11,2 
0 ,9 
51,1 
" , 2 
100,0 
8,6 
3 ,2 
Snert 
T e r -
0 , 0 
6 ,7 
0 , 0 
0 ,4 
89 ,5 
3 , -
ι J o , ■_ 
o.¿ 
■ 0 ,2 
M e c i j " sno 
Lo^o Term 
3 2 , 1 
7 ,1 
14,0 
1,C 
¿1 ,4 
4 , 4 
1 " 7 
*"* i '-' 
1 9 8 5 
Tota l 
27 ,7 
5 ,2 
8 ,5 
0 ,8 
53,8 
4 , 0 
103,0 
0 ,9 
2 ,5 
Snort 
Tern 
0 ,0 
0 ,0 
0 ,6 
0 ,5 
92,7 
6 ,2 
130,0 
0 ,0 
0 ,8 
Mediu-" and 
Long Tern 
3 2 , 9 
' 6 , 1 
10,0 
0 , 9 
¿6,¿ 
3 ,7 
100,0 
10,1 
2 , 9 
-ï Bank of Portugal, 
- 103 -
These unmeasured financial needs were mainly due to the low 
auto-financing levels of the companies, which demanded 
recourse to credit. The credit, from an internal point of 
view, was restricted in this period: there were high 
interest rates in force, which have made debt service very 
expensive since 1982. 
Public Enterprises were, however, the companies in the best 
position to have external credit, not only because they are 
the largest, but also because they benefitted from implict 
collateral security from the State, which facilitated bor­
rowing in international markets. 
The joint effect of the devaluation of the Portuguese escudo 
and of the high interest rates in said markets made debt 
service too heavy, creating even greater a posteriori diffi­
culties at a financial level. Further, most of the time 
these companies were unable to reflect cost increases (which 
derived not only from internal inflation but also from the 
debt service and other costs) in prices, due to a restric­
tive price policy, which increased cash difficulties. 
In 1983, these companies were responsible for 51 per cent of 
the total external debt, a percentage which rose to 54 per 
cent in 1985 (See Chart IX). Τ,η addition, in the period 
between 1981 and 1983, the nominal value of this debt grew 
by two thirds when expressed in United States Dollars. This 
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situation has begun to regain equilibrium since 1985. 
6.2. Behavior of State Monopolies and Other Public 
Enterprises in Basic Sectors of the Economy 
6.2.1. Adaption of Commercial Monopolies 
Adaption of commercial monopolies began during the period 
prior to accession to the European Communities with the 
progressive break-up of the "AGA — Administração-Geral do 
Açúcar e do Alcool (General Administration for Sugar and 
Alcohol)" monopoly on imports and distribution of raw sugar 
It was with Decree-Law N2 508/85, of December 31, that a 
process of liberalization of imports and commercialization 
of alcoholic raw materials began. It does not, however, 
completely satisfy Community authorities. 
Three different products must be distinguished in the 
alcohol sector: 
a) Ethilic alcohol of agricultural origin included in 
Annex II to the EEC Treaty, as modified by Regulation 
NQ 7bis of the Council of Ί959 (Cf. OJ NS 7, of 
January 22, 1961, p. 71 ) ; 
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b) Ethilic alcohol of non-agricultural origin included in 
tariff positions ex 22.08 A and B and ex 22.09 A 
(Nimexe code 22.08-10 and 22.08-30) of the common 
customs tariff; and 
c) Brandies of a vinic origin used for manufacturing Port 
wine of tariff position 22.09 CVa aa and b aa (Nimexe 
code 22.09-81 and 22.09-91) and which, like ethilic 
alcohol of a non-agricultural origin, must be con-
sidered an industrial product, by force of the 
community regulation mentioned above under a). 
As concerns these different products, the Commission of the 
European Communities has prepared a recommendation, fixing 
both the adaption calendar and the liberalization rhythm 
(Cf. OJ NQ L306, of October 28, 1987, p. 32.) 
As concerns petroleum products, though the monopoly was the 
only one to receive adequate treatment in the Act of Acces-
sion, the fact is that Portuguese authorities have not given 
this monopoly the treatment which they are obliged. 
An initial adaption of the monopoly of imports of petroleum 
products, which is exercised by the State through the Public 
Enterprise "PETROGAL," began both with the publication of 
Decree-Law NQ 525/85, of December 31, and of Government 
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Regulation NQ 969/85, of the same date. Under the terms of 
these two documents, quotas of the dependent market of 
liquid fuels, which previously benefitted the established 
companies, were abolished and the quota attributed to 
"PETROGAL" is being progressively reduced. Additionally, 
the State tries to guarantee access to the market of 
companies headquarted in Member-States, in conditions which 
are apparently objective and non-discriminatory. 
However, not only the list of the products which are the 
object of the above-mentioned Decree-Law NQ 525/85 is dif-
ferent from the list of products referred in Article 208, 
par. 3, of the Act of Accession, but also there are some 
doubts concerning the policy of monopoly prices, which was 
regulated for the last time by Government Regulation NQ 
99/87, of February 12. 
The Commission is also not satisfied with the management of 
the adaption of this monopoly by Portuguese authorities. A 
Commission recommendation is being prepared as a result. 
Another state monopoly is also being dismantled — "EPAC," a 
Public Enterprise. Until recently, it had the exclusive 
right of purchasing nationally produced wheat and importing 
cereal grains, which is expressly mentioned in Articles 319, 
line b), and 320 of the Act of Accession. The orientation 
of these two Articles was implemented in Decrees-Law NQ 
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61/86 and 65/86, both of March 25, which are not being 
discussed, as they do not concern this study. 
6.2.2. Behavior of Public Enterprises in General 
The behavior of the Public Enterprises reflects on a large 
scale the political conditions under which they were created 
immediately after the nationalization process and the 
growing State intervention in the economy which was opera-
tive in 1975 and the following years. 
Public Enterprises were used as instruments of momentaneous 
economic policy, almost as anticycli cal, investing and main-
taining work places in periods of crisis and in sectors 
which internationally were already extraneous, as well as 
not raising prices in periods of great inflation. 
As concerns prices, it is important to explain that Public 
Enterprises were subject to a tight system of control, with 
definite influence on their competitive behavior. 
This system was either connected with the General Law for 
the Control of Prices (Decree-Law NQ 329-A/74, of July 10), 
or derived from a legal basis specific to the sector under 
analysis. 
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In fact, because the General Law for the Control of Prices 
existed prior to the nationalizations, there was some 
vagueness and equivocation as concerns the limits of Public 
Enterprises' competence and of their controls concerning the 
fixing of prices, which came to be regulated, in the case of 
the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Export, by Government 
Regulation NQ 4/78. Said document states that Public Enter-
prises which are subject to the control of this Ministry, 
are subject to the regimes provided for by Decrees-Law NQ 
329-A/74 and 75-A/77, i.e., the General Law for the Control 
of Prices, establishing a list of exceptions based on fis-
cal, political or social arguments, which are subject to a 
specific regime. 
Most of the Public Enterprises' functions were then sub-
mitted to the administrative regulations of Control of 
Prices. 
However, tracing the evolution of said regulations, one can 
see a move in the direction of deregulation, with the aim of 
a progressive lessening of control measures. 
In situations subject to a Maximum Price Regime, one can see 
a progressive move to situations in which the control is 
exercised a posteriori, with relevance for the Price Regime 
observed. It means, in practical terms, the possibility of 
companies managing their own price increases, as well as the 
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opportunity for their execution. 
Recently, mainly since 1984, the behavior of public economic 
agents has been influenced by a general trend toward 
deregulation. One can add to this an important element from 
the introduction, for the first time in Portugal, of a law 
for the defense of competition inspired by the community 
model. 
On July 01, 1984, the Law for the Defense of Competition was 
in force (Decree-Law NQ 422/83, of December 03), and a pro-
gressive flexibility in the price control regime in dif-
ferent sectors was apparent, including Public Enterprises. 
There is an evolution of two kinds of factors which are 
inversely proportional: as progress is made in the mech-
anisms of competition, it is also made in deregulation 
through accelerated nonintervention on the part of the 
Administration in the price control system. 
In concludion, this deregulation translates into: 
exclusion from the different Price Regime of a priori 
control (maximum, declared, conventioned, special) a 
significant number of products and services, at the 
production / import stage; 
increase in the number of products and services subject 
to an a posteriori (i.e., observed) Price Regime, both 
at the production / import and the commercialization 
stage; 
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liberalization of the commercialization margins of most 
products and services; 
revocation of the subsidiary system provided in Article 
24 of Decree-Law NQ 41 204, of July 24, 1957, which 
means that only products for which there are published 
documents establishing margins are subject to an ad-
ministrative control at the commercialization stage. 
6.2.3. Mineral Sector (Coal Subsector) 
a) Introduction 
The behavior of the companies in the sector has been 
conditioned due to structural arguments, including the 
followi ng: 
- reduced dimension, as compared to the other European 
companies; 
- inclusion in peripherial zones, with the addition of 
significant stimulae to regional development; 
- geological-structural complexity of the explored mines; 
- difficulty of rationalization, probably due to 
intensive mechanization and creation of new processes 
for recognizing and evaluating reserves; 
- greater or lesser temporary evaluation of national coal 
as compared to other imported fuels. 
As a consequence of these circumstances, existing explora-
tions in several areas of the country have progressively 
been closed, being restricted in the past years only to 
mines in the "Bacia Carbonífera Dúrico-Beirã," in the 
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northern interior. This is, in fact, the most extensive 
carbon basin and potentially most favorable in the country. 
However, its structural geological complexity as well as 
difficulties of recognizing and evaluation have made 
production somewhat difficult. 
b) Control of Activity by the State 
The behavior of the companies, public or private, is strong-
ly influenced by State defined plans through the Ministry 
of Control, primarily since 1983, when an energy policy was 
initiated with strong State intervention in the areas of 
coal prospecting and production. 
This policy has been developed around the following sectors: 
Centralization in the Public Enterprise "EDM — Empresa 
de Desenvolvimento Mineiro, EP," of all planning, 
recognition and evaluation work in the mines of the 
Douro coal basin; 
Creation of conditions for coal production to generate 
positive results; 
Financial recovery and increase in the corporate capi-
tal of the "Empresa Carbonífera do Douro, SARL — ECD, 
SARL;" 
Fixing of a new price scheme, indexed to the evolution 
of the external fuel-oil component (Government Regula-
tions NQ 276/84, of May 04, and NQ 241/86, of May 23); 
Addition of a 15 per cent "ad-valorem" to the produc-
tion of coal, to generate V avenues for the Direction of 
Geology and Mines which manages the entire system. 
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c) Market Shares 
The "ECD, SARL" now has the concession for the only active 
subterranean antracite mine, with an annual production of 
some 280,000 tons of "tout-venant" (approximately 210,000 
commercial tons), which corresponds to over 95 per cent of 
total national extracted coal. 
The remaining production (less than five per cent) is the 
concession of another company, the "TERRIMINAS" which only 
recovers residuals from open pit mines in Säo Pedro da 
Cova. 
The "ECD" production is mainly for production of electricity 
in a thermo-electrical central, located some kilometers dis-
tant from the mine, with transfer of the product through a 
system of gondola lifts. 
d) Financial Relations between the State and the Public 
Enterprises 
The State has followed a policy of subsidizing the differ-
ence between the expected average revenue and average cost 
of exploration, with the aim of giving possibilities not on-
ly to current exploration but also to the renovating pro-
cesses under way, adapting the exploration of the only coal 
mine to new and demanding community and world energy market 
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conditions (due to Portugal's excessive dependence on exter-
nal energy, 85 per cent of global consumption and 80 per 
cent on petroleum, a diversification policy of primary ener-
gy sources, energetic safety and of independence of petrol-
eum, assumes particular importance). 
Based on data available, the financial effort of the last 
years was the following: 
(In millions of Portuguese escudos) 
- 1983 20 485 
- 1984 101 486 
- 1985 169 751 
Beginning in mid-1985, there has been a temporary unfavor-
able frame for products in the primary energy markets, which 
along with the devaluation of the dollar, has consequences 
for the drop of the average provisional revenues. 
It is expected that during the current year the State will 
have to subsidize every extracted ton in approximately 3.171 
Portuguese escudos. 
e) Typology of Competition 
The Portuguese coal sector suffers from the distortions of 
competition which resulted from State intervention which, 
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however, might be considered parallel to the enforceable in 
other Member-States. The dimension of the market creates an 
external technological limitation to the atomization of the 
market and favors the existence of an unique company. 
The remaining factors connected with the structural geo-
logical complexity converge in the same direction. 
The situation, then, is very close to a natural monopoly. 
According to available data, there were no significant im-
ports and exports. In 1981, 12,644 tons of antracite coal, 
with a value of 103,183 million Portuguese escudos and 
335,308 tons of black coal, with a value of 1,737,371 mil-
lion Portuguese escudos were imported. 
6.2.4. Industrial Sector 
6.2.4.1. Petroleum Sub-Sector 
a) Introduction 
By Decree-Law NQ 205-A/75, of April 16, the State nationali 
zed the following companies: 
- "SACOR -- Sociedade Anónima Concessionária da Refina-
ção de Petróleos, SARL" (proprietor of the two then 
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existing petroleum refineries, Cabo Ruivo and 
Matosinhos);. 
- "PETROSUL — Sociedade Portuguesa de Refinação de 
Petróleos, SARL" (which was going to install the Sines 
refinery and in which the State already held 33.3 per 
cent); 
- "SONAP — Sociedade Nacional de Petróleos, SARL;" and 
- "CIDLA — Combustíveis Industriais e Domésticos, 
SARL." 
Approximately one year later, by Decree-Law NQ 217-A/76, of 
May 26, the State created the Public Enterprise "PETROGAL — 
Petróleos de Portugal, EP," which included the above men-
tioned four nationalized companies, with the following 
objectives: 
- Research and exploration of crude and natural gas; 
- Refining crude and its derivities; 
- Transportation, distribution and commercialization of 
crude, its derivities and natural gas. 
b) Control of Activity by the State 
Through PETROGAL, the State controls the entire petroleum 
refining sector and approximately sixty per cent of the 
petroleum products distribution sector. 
A monopoly of refining exists which can be interpreted as a 
State monopoly of distribtuion / import of refined products, 
i . e. : 
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- gasoline, 
- lighting petroleum, 
- gasoi1 and 
- fuel oi 1. 
c) Market Shares 
It is possible to trace the participation of different com-
panies in the distribution of petroleum products through 
governmental resolutions which have proceeded to substan-
tiate the liberalization of the sector in the sequence as-
sumed in the framing of the act of accession', particularly 
in Article 208. The following Chart shows the expected 
distribution for 1987. 
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d) Typology of Competition 
As previously noted, both a monopoly of production and a 
commercial monopoly exist, they are in the process of being 
adapted to the terms of Article 208 of the Act of Accession. 
In fact, in accord with the legislation in force at the time 
of the accession, with the exception of the market for re-
export of goods (aerial and maritime navigation), the import 
and distribution of refined products with consumption in 
Portugal are subject to a regime of previous authorizations 
granted by the State. 
This regime applies to the four products mentioned under b) 
above. 
In the terms of the list annexed to Decree-Law NQ 519/85, of 
December 31, the regime can also be applied to eight more 
products not anticipated in Article 208 of the Act of 
Accession. 
The existence of monopoly has in some way affected intercom-
munity exchanges, perhaps because there are indications 
that even in the liberalized sector, some companies prefer 
signing processing contracts to use the untaxed warehouses 
of PETROGAL. 
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e) Financial Relations between the State and the Public 
Enterprises 
Petrogal has to contend with an acumulation of debts which 
have not been regularized by the Public Sector, either 
administrative or commercial. 
The most relevant are the debts of the "Fundo de Abasteci-
mento (Supply Fund)," the "Fundo de Garantia de Riscos 
Cambiais (Fund for Guarantee of Exchange Risks)" and the 
State Company Sector. 
f) Price Regime 
The prices of petroleum products are subject to a complete 
intervention by the State at various stages of commerciali-
zation. 
6.2.4.2. Petrochemical Sub-Sector 
a) Introduction 
The following Public Enterprises are accented: 
- "PETROGAL - Petróleos de Portugal, EP" 
... refineries and petroleum products used in the 
perfume industry 
- "Companhia Nacional de Petroquímica (CNP)" 
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... ultra-refined petroleum products / steam-cracker 
- "PGP - Petroquímica e Gás de Portugal" 
... ammonia and phtalic anhydride 
- "QUIMIGAL - Química de Portugal, EP" 
... ammonia, acids, fertilizers, aniline, polioils 
b) Control of Activity by the State 
The development of the Portuguese petrochemical sector has 
been intimitely associated with the Sines complex, which 
means that it was conceived, executed and controlled almost 
in its entirety by the State. 
In fact, the entire internal logic of the Portuguese "Piano 
Petroquímico (Petrochemical Plan)" derives from the 
articulation of the four above-mentioned Public Enterprises 
and their associates, in the framing of stratigic 
orientation defined by the State. 
We are concerned with one of the few sectors in which a 
Condicionamento Industrial (Government Control of Industry) 
still survives, which in general terms was done away with by 
the 1974 revolution. 
The crisis situation exists today, especially as concerns 
CNP, to a great degree because the state has not had the 
capacity to execute the plan in its entirety, because the 
originally planned program of investment was interrupted. 
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In effect, the complex of ultra-refined petroleum products 
was conceived in terms of a series of coordinated produc-
tions and quantitatively logical, in which the exports were 
programmed for second or third generation products or for 
plastics (solid), which are more easily placed in the market 
than (usually liquid) or the large intermediates (gases). 
The CNP was oriented to attempt "joint-ventures" designed to 
assure the sales of quantities required to be exported. 
This was, in part, successful, vis-à-vis association with 
the CDF Chimie in EPSI. 
On the whole, however, the project was a failure. En-
visioned projects were not realized, and thus broke the 
intended chain of production. The operating tax was well 
below the "break-even point" and the entire earnings of the 
project remained in question. 
c) Market Shares 
It is difficult to precisely quantify the concerned Market 
Shares, because a diversified group of products is in-
volved, many having strong interconnections (See the pre-
vious chart). 
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fin summary, it is possible to make an estimate, which also 
shows the weakness of the production destined for the exter-
nal market (See Chart X). y , q A u 
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We can, provisionally, draw the following conclusions: 
i) - The production of BTX was orignal ly planned for the 
export and complete satisfaction of the internal 
market (a.a.d.); 
ii) - The production of any!ine is almost totally 
exhausted in production of isocyanides (ISOPOR); 
iii) - The production of specialties is insufficient for 
the internal market, resulting in significant 
imports (f.e.g. ) ; 
iv) - The production of ultra-refined petroleum products 
(h. and i) is much below capacity; 
v) - As concerns the production of poli-ultra-refi ned 
petroleum products,: 
. I DP is sufficient for internal market demand; 
whi le 
. HDP and PP are not sufficient for internal market 
demand. 
d) Financial Relations between the State and the Public 
Enterprises 
The State, which conceived and built the national 
petrochemical plan, based on the complete nationalization of 
capital, verified that it did not have the available capital 
to maintain the rhythm of investment that the program 
demanded. 
Thus, in addition to delay the beginning of enterprises 
which were not yet initiated, the State was not able to 
maintain its capital endowments.at the required level and 
gave orientations for companies -- mainly to CNP -- to 
obtain external financing. 
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Interest charges -and the high amounts envolved pushed these 
projects -- mainly the CNP -- into an enormous debt spiral. 
The decapi tal ization of companies and the expansion of long 
term programs with short term financing come to be 
di sastrous. 
e) Price Regime 
These products, because they are basic raw materials, are 
today subject to the two least strict Price Regime provided 
by law: 
- free or controlled (i.e. a posteriori control). 
f) Access to the Factors of Production and to the 
Financial Markets 
In addition to the above-mentioned capital factor, there are 
no particulars deriving from the nature of the Public 
Enterprises. 
g) Typology of Competition 
Until the accession, and because*of the administrative pro-
tection exercised through the BRIs (Bulletins for the Regis-
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try of Imports) — import licenses, production was assured 
in a regime of de facto monopoly, which still exists in por-
tions of the internal market supplied by local production. 
The only authorised imports were of some specific products 
("especificações") not produced in sufficient quantity 
local 1 y. 
Since the accession, these restrictions are coming to an 
end, but the legal barrier of accession of new companies to 
the production of said goods is still in force. 
6.2.4.3. Fertilizer Sub-Sector 
a) Introduction 
As previously, we are dealing with a segment of the chemical 
industry, in which there are two companies (See the previous 
Diagram): 
- one public: "QUIMIGAL" 
- one private: "SAPEC" 
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b) Control of Activity by the State 
This is a sector with strong State control in various 
aspects and attention should be called to Decree-Law NQ 
97/78, of May 19, and to the Portuguese Norm, NP-1048. 
This document approved the Regulation of Exercise of 
Activities of the Fabrication, Preparation, Mixing, Import-
ing and Sale of Fertilizers and Agricultural Correctives, 
the terms of which were subject to previous licences issued 
by the Ministry of Industry and Technology. 
In awarding the concession of this licence, the administra-
tive authorities demand that the fertilizers conform to the 
specifications of NP-1048. 
Those fertilizers not satisfying the specifications con-
tained in NP-1048, can not be marketed. 
There is here a Measure of Effect Equivalent to Quantitative 
Restrictions that affects trade between the Member-States. 
c) Market Shares 
The following market percentages can be ascertained, 
although with some imprecision,*due to the non-existence of 
statistics and correlations between the various types of 
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ferti1 i zers: 
- "QUIMIGAL" 70 % 
- "SAPEC" 30 % 
The imports have been irrelevant, mainly under the auspices 
of the above-mentioned enterprises, as concerns fertilizers 
subject to State control. 
d) Financial Relations between the State and the Public 
Enterpri ses 
For many years, the State has financed the difference 
between the price of sale to the agricultural' sector, which 
is administratively fixed, and the real technical-economic 
costs of the two companies. 
There is a special commission for estimating the accountancy 
of the two companies which annually determines the amount of 
the subsidy to be paid. 
Until this time, the private company has not had complaints, 
which could signify that it has been treated equally, vis-à-
vis the Public Enterprise. 
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e) Price Regime 
Fertilizers are subject to a more interventionist Price 
Regime than the legislature had anticipated - Maximum Price 
Regime. 
Under the terms of Article 1, par. 2, of Decree-Law NQ 329-
A/74, of June 10, this regime implies a price fixed at a 
level that can not be exceeded in different periods of 
economic activity which might be considered convenient. 
f) Typology of Competition 
A duopoly with strong barriers to both to the entry of new 
internal competitors or imports exists. 
In fact, beyond the barrier referred to above under b), 
administrative control of external commerce via the BRIs 
still exists. Only those fertilizers included in the 
"especificações," meaning non-locally produced, are 
imported, and only in strictly necessary quantities. 
Within this framework, there has been no significant 
competitive rivalry between "QUIMIGAL" and "SAPEC." There 
has mainly been reciprocal acceptance of their positions. 
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In spite of the accession to the European Communities and 
the end of the BRIs, the above-mentioned legal barrier still 
exi sts. 
6.2.4.4. Cement Sub-Sector 
a) Introduction 
The State still completely dominates this strategic sector. 
In fact, by Decree-Law NQ 221-A/75, of May 09, the State na-
tionalized the seven then existing cement companies as well 
as nationally-held shares of a Danish company, in which it 
became the majority share-holder. 
Presently, there are three companies: 
- one public: "CIMPOR — Cimentos de Portugal, EP;" 
- another, in which the State is a majority participant 
(59%): "SECIL — Companhia Geral de Cal e Cimento, SA; 
- a third, with capital is completely held by "CIMPOR": 
"ECI — Entreposto Comercial das Ilhas." 
It should be noted that State-held companies in this sector 
have high performances, at the same level of other European 
and private companies, although the prices of the final 
products are among the lowest of the European competitors. 
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b) Control of Activity by the State 
In addition to completely dominating the cement sector, the 
State also became a majority participant in complementary 
companies in the construction materials sector: 
"BATICEL - Materiais Aglutinados, SA" 100.00% 
"BEPOR - Betões Portugueses, SA" 100.00% 
"Betão Liz, SA" 100.00% 
"Est. Sciai do Norte, Limitada" 65.00% 
"Estrela do Mondego, Limitada" 100.00% 
"Fábrica de Cal Hidráulica do Mondego" 100.00% 
"Fábrica Jerónimo Pereira Campos, SA" 71.00% 
"JOMATEL - Empresa de Materiais de 
Construção, SA" 51 .00% 
"MARBLARTE - Man. Mármores Decorativos, SA" . 84.40% 
"NORBETÄO - Materiais de Construção, SA" .... 88.20% 
"PRECIPOR - Materiais de Construção 
de Portugal, SA" 99.00% 
"Secil Betão, SA" 54.00% 
"SELCAL - Sociedade de Cal de 
Souselas, Limitada" 96.67% 
"SULBETÄ0 - Preparados de Betão" 99.00% 
"UNIBETÄ0 - Ind. Betão Preparado" 99.97% 
The State gained control approximately 52 per cent of con-
crete production, thus consolidating its control of the 
cement industry. 
With a similar objective, the State held approximately 20 
per cent in the fire resistant material industry, via 
participation in "ABRIGADA — Companhia Nacional de 
Refractários, SA." 
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Another fact facilitating State control is the high company 
concentration. 
Although some factories exist (one, "SOUSELAS", is the 
largest on the Iberian Penninsula,) throughout most of 
national territory, there are only two independent 
companies, both of which are controlled by the State. 
c) Market Shares 
The market percentages, which have been maintained for the 
last ten years, are approximately three quarters of the 
market for "CIMPOR" and approximately one quarter for 
"SECIL." 
Attention must also be called to an almost perfect 
correlation between internal production and consumption, the 
external market being, for the most part, marginal. 
The present internal market is approximately seven million 
tons, while ten years ago it was approximately 2.7 million 
tons. 
Cement is sold in bulk or in bags. Bulk sales amount for 
approximately 25 per cent of the total. 
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Cement sold in bulk is primarally sold to end users, while 
bag cement goes through a long chain of distributors 
numbering over one thousand. 
d) Financial Relations between the State and the Public 
Enterprises 
"CIMPOR" has been generating income for the State (from 1978 
to 1983 it contributed for the the Treasury with 
9,900,000,000 Portuguese escudos.) 
Thus, the development of the company has been financed by 
both its own funds and external credits which were obtained 
following State directives. 
Investments made since its creation, in March 1976, in 
current prices of the successive financial years, amount to 
16,000,000,000 Portuguese escudos. 
e) Price Regime 
For many years cement prices were subject to a strong State 
intervention as concerns prices, with a priori control. 
Until recently they were subject to "regime de preços 
declarados (declared Price Regime)," meaning that companies 
had to submit their prices prior to announcing them, based 
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on a certain cost structure. The Administration had the 
right to oppose them. 
In recent months, there has been a consistent trend toward 
making the system more flexible, approved by Regulatory 
Dispatch NQ 73/87, published on August 18, 1987, under whose 
terms prices would pass to a declared Price Regime, in which 
prices are established by agreement of the Administration 
and the companies. 
Prices in force are among the lowest in Europe, being higher 
only than Italian and Greek prices, as can be seen on the 
following chart: 
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f) Access to Factors of Production and to the Financial 
Market 
In addition to the above-mentioned capital factor, there are 
no particulars deriving from the nature of the Public 
Enterprises. 
g) Regime of Public Works 
All public works under the auspices of the State use 
nationally produced cement. 
This does not mean, however, that there exist legal restric-
tions. This circumstance derives from the structure of 
supply and the entry barriers which already existed. 
The regime of public works is regulated by Decree-Law NQ 
235/86, of August 18, which aims at introducing in Portu-
guese legislation all competition rules regulated by 
Directives NQs 71/304/EEC and 71/305/EEC. 
h) Typology of Competition 
A duopoly exists, with two companies effectively dividing 
the existing market, with no significant competition between 
them. 
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The location of the factories and the distribution ware-
houses as well as the cost of transport, define a natural 
market at each point of sale, which translates into the non-
existence of commercial rivalry in supply. 
Spanish cement has only sporadically been imported, but the 
quantities involved are insufficient to change this climate 
of convergence. 
With the accession, however, it can be anticipated that this 
situation will gradually change, mainly in the frontier 
areas. 
6.2.4.5. Cellulose and Paper Sub-Sector 
a) Introduction 
With the nationalizations in 1975 (Decree-Law NQ 221-B/75, 
of May 09) the State took possession of all national com-
panies producing cellulose pulp and all the shares of "CELBI 
- Celulose Beirã Industrial" belonging to Portuguese 
citi zens. 
There is a Public Enterprise "PORTUCEL - Empresa de Celulose 
e de Papel de Portugal" which was created by Decree-Law NQ 
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554-A/76, of July 14, and which includes the following 
companies : 
- "CPC - Companhia Portuguesa de Celulose, SARL"; 
- "Celulose do Guadiana, SARL"; 
- "CELTEJO - Celulose do Tejo, SARL"; 
- "CELNORTE - Celuloses do Norte, SARL"; 
- "SOCEL - Sociedade Industrial de Celulose, SARL." 
The other companies in the sector are 
"SOPORCEL - Sociedade Portuguesa de Celulose, SARL," 
whose capital holdings are: 
"Wiggens Teape Group Ltd" 42.8% 
"Sociedade Financeira Portuguesa" 42.7% 
Some Portuguese Banks 14.5% 
"CELBI - Celulose Beira Industrial, SARL": 
The Swiss group, "Stora Kopparberg" 71% 
The State 29% 
- "COMPANHIA DE CELULOSE DO CAIMA, SARL"; 
"Eucaliptus Pulp Mills" (United Kingdom) 93.1% 
The situation in the paper industry is diverse. 
The State is the majority participant in the segments of 
corrugated paper, via the central factories in Cacia and 
Albarraque, close to "PORTUCEL." "UNOR" is the major 
private company in this segment. 
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The State has a significant participation in three companies 
in the paper sub-sector: 
- "COMPANHIA DO PAPEL DO PRADO, SARL" 22.3% 
- "SOCIEDADE PORTUGUESA NOVEMBAL, SARL" 22.5% 
- "INAPA - Industria Nacional de Papéis, SARL" ... 22.3% 
Ninety-four paper companies exist. 
In the following chart, various elements of the two sub-
sectors — cellulose and paper — are compared, which 
permits evaluation of their structure and behavior. 
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b) Control of 'Activity by the State 
The State has controlled the industry which exploits one of 
the principal natural resources of the country, through the 
policy followed by "PORTUCEL," through its domination of 
forrestry, through integration of the different central 
factories with the competing companies, through the export 
strategy. 
c) Market Shares 
The following graph provides an estimate of the internal 
market position of the various cellulose companies, 
differentiating among the various types of pulps produced: 
C H A R T X I V 
Market Shares of the Cellulose Companies 
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This sector has a global productive capacity of 1.3 millions 
of tons, the rate'of utilization at a level of 85 to 90%. 
d) Price Regime 
Under the terms of Government Regulation NQ134-B/80, of May 
26, cellulose pulp prices are subject to a special regime 
anticipated in Article 17 of Decree-Law NQ 329-A/74, of July 
10, which established a structure of costs previously 
approved by the Administration. 
The State, then, exercises a tight a priori control. 
Recently, the system is in the process of becoming more 
flexi ble. 
In August 1984, with Government Regulation NQ 614/84, the 
prices of pulp for the internal market stopped being in 
direct relation to costs, moving to prices established with 
basis on export prices expressed in United States Dollars, 
with quarterly revisions. 
In October, 1985, with the Regulatory Dispatch NQ 100/85, 
the prices of pulp moved to a more flexible Price Regime, 
that is, a "regime of surveyed prices," in the stages of 
production, imports and commercialization, in which control 
is effected a posterior i. 
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e) Access to the Factors of Production and to the 
Financial Market 
The cellulose industry in the country naturally has easy 
access to the essential factor of production, which is a raw 
materi al. 
As concerns "PORTUCEL," there is no particular deriving from 
the nature as a Public Enterprise. 
f) Typology of Competition 
One is faced with an oligopoly in which the highest 
competitive forces in European and world industry are 
present. 
In the capital of "CELBI," the acquisition of "Billerud" 
shares by "Stora Kopparberg" (both Swedish) is in keeping 
with the strategy of what is thought to be the largest 
European company, and the seventh largest worldwide, as far 
as securing supplies of raw materials under preferential 
conditions. 
In the capital of "SOPORCEL," the entry of "Wiggens Teape" 
(owned by "BAT Industries"), prejudices both the intentions 
of "Billerud," and the property of "PORTUCEL," translating, 
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in the final analysis, a strategic option for a community 
paper group with financial, technological and commercial 
capacity to integrate the new factory to a larger market. 
Thus, we see that the Public Enterprise, "PORTUCEL," is 
confronted with a competitive degree that can be 
accertained, having in mind current models at the community 
and world markets. 
6.2.4.6. Ironworks Sub-Sector 
a) Introduction 
The Public Enterprise "SIDERURGIA NACIONAL, EP" was created 
by Decree-Law NQ 853/76, of December 18, following the 
nationalization of the "SIDERURGIA NACIONAL, SARL" by 
Decree-Law NQ 205-F/75, of April 16. 
The intervention of the State in the ironworks sector has 
been the object of frequent contact with the community 
authorities, as concerns the restructuring of the sector. 
146 
b) Control of Activity by the State and Financial 
Relations 
1. The State, through the Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers NQ 51/85, of October 28, approved a physical con-
iguration of the "Plano de Reestruturação da Siderurgia 
Nacional (PRSN)," as well as its financial influence. 
The objectives of not enlarging the productive capacity, but 
conferring on them competitive conditions and maintaining 
the possibilities of exploring the iron ore of Moncorvo in 
the future must be noted. 
In this framework, the physical configuration of the PRSN 
derives from the following parameters: 
i) improvement of the present operating conditions of 
the present furnaces and of the treatment and 
transference of the cast-iron to the "aciaria"; 
ii) readaption of labor conditions in the "aciaria" 
raising the useful unit cargoes of the convertor 
and installation of a new continuous melting unit 
replacing the presently existing one; 
iii) renovation of the existing continuous trains in 
Seixal and in Maia; 
iv) improvement of the quality of plane products from 
Sei xal; 
v) partial renovation of the foundry coke unit. 
An additional investment which,' in terms of GFFC at 1985 
prices, can be estimated at approximately 15,000,000,000 
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Portuguese escudos, corresponds to this plan. 
The financial involvement of the State in this plan will be 
expressed in the following terms: 
a) annual capital endowments amounting to 33 per cent 
of the investment in the PRSN; 
b) payment, on the date due, of the debt service di-
rectly connected with the obligations assumed by the 
"Siderurgia Nacional" under the terms of the "Piano 
de Expansão dos Produtos Longos do Seixal (PEPLS);" 
c) annual subsidization of the payment of all charges 
indirectly motivated by all compromises assumed in 
the sphere of PEPLS; 
d) payment of an annual compensatory subsidy, until the 
date all results anticipated by PRSN in the 
operation of the company are obtained. 
All revenues resulting from the possible sale of equipment 
acquired under PELPS and now available as well as all 
subsidies given by the CECA to the "Siderurgia Nacional" 
must be deducted from these amounts. 
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Under these terms, the "Siderurgia Nacional" showed the 
following financial fluctuations during 1986: 
Subsidies 4 X 106 thousands of PTE 
Investments 86 1.4 X 106 thousands of PTE 
Financial recovery 6.62 X 106 thousands of PTE 
2. As a result of the examation taken both by repre-
sentatives of the Portuguese Administration and the EEC, 
under the terms of Protocol NQ 20, annexed to the Act of 
Accession, the Council of Ministers ratified, by Resolution 
made on July 10, 1987, the maximum "plafonds" of interven-
tion in the "Siderurgia Nacional, EP." The EEC was notified 
on December 31, 1986: 
i) maximum amount of 13,000,000,000 Portuguese 
escudos for investment in the PRSN, at prices of 
December 31, 1986; 
ii) maximum of 21,000,000,000 Portuguese escudos in 
compensatory subsidies for operation deficits 
between January 01, 1986 and December 31, 1986; 
iii) maximum of liabilities directly or indirectly 
connected with PEPLS to be covered by the State: 
49,000,000,000 Portuguese escudos, at prices of 
December 31, 1986. 
By Dispatch of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce of July 
02, 1987, and in accordance with the above-mentioned 
Resolution of the Council of Ministers, however, the 
following changes in the physical configuration of the Plan 
for the Restructuring of the "Siderurgia Nacional" were 
approved : 
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- ending "bi lete" production by ingot-blooming; 
- ending production of heavy profiles; 
- ending production of steel in electrical furnaces in 
the Seixal factory, in 1991. 
6.2.4.7. Beer Sub-Sector 
a) Introduction 
The beer sector includes two Public Enterprises, which were 
created by Decree-Law NQ 531/77, of December 30, resulting 
from the consolidation of several beer companies which had 
been nationalized by Decree-Law NQ 474/75, of August 30: 
"Central de Cervejas, EP - CENTRALCER," the consoli-
dation of the nationalized companies "Sociedade Central 
de Cervejas" and "Cergal - Cervejas de Portugal." 
"União Cervejeira, EP - UNICER," resulting from the 
merger of the "CUFP - Companhia União Fabril 
Portuguesa," the "COPEJA - Companhia Portuguesa de 
Cervejas" and the "IMPERIAL - União Cervejeira de 
Portugal." 
b) Control of Activity by the State 
Through the above-mentioned nationalization, the State not 
only took total control of the beer sector in mainland 
Portugal, but also obtained a si-jni f i cant position in the 
soft drink sector, as well as obtained majority holdings in 
one wine company and two water companies. 
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Said Decree-Law also nationalized beer factory shares not 
belonging to foreign entities in the Azores and Madeira. 
"CENTRALCER" received the public sector participations in 
the following distributing companies by transfer: 
- "ARCOREL - Agentes Reunidos de Comércio e 
Representações, Limitada;" 
- "CERVINHAL - Distribuidora de Cervejas e Vinhos de 
Viseu, Limitada;" 
- "CERVISUL - Sociedade Distribuidora de Cervejas do Sul, 
Limi tada;" 
- "CERLIZ - União das Distribuidoras de Cervejas do 
Centro, Limitada;" 
- "Sociedade Distribuidora de Bebidas de Portalegre, 
Limi tada;" 
- "Sociedade Distribuidora de Cervejas do- Alto Alentejo, 
Limi tada;" 
- "Sociedade Distribuidora de Cervejas do Vouga, 
Limitada;" 
- "UNACEL - União de Agentes Comerciais, Limitada;" 
- "Refri girantes Associados de Portalegre, Limitada;" 
as wel 1 as 
- "URFIL - Sociedade de Construções, Limitada; 
- "Quinta do Grajel, SARL." 
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c) Market Shares 
The market is divided between the Public Enterprises, with a 
proportion of approximately 60 per cent for "CENTRALCER" and 
40 per cent for "UNICER." 
Taking into account the location of the factories, a natural 
market exists which is geographically deliniated by 
transportation costs. 
"UNICER" has mainly the southern and northern markets, and 
"CENTRALCER," the center market including Coimbra. 
In approximate terms, the following market quotas may be 
accepted: 
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d) Financial Relations between the State and the Public 
Enterprises 
The State functions here more as a recipient of taxes 
assessed on beer than as an investor. 
In fact, the State has been receiving abnormally high tax 
payments since 1981 and has not raised statutory capital. 
e) Price Regime 
Since the publication of the "Lei Quadro de Preços (Price-
Framing Law)" -- Decree NQ 329-A/79, of June 10 --, beer has 
been subject to several Price Regime. 
At present, at the production / import level, it is subject 
to the declared Price Regime provided by Decree-Law NQ 75-
Q/77, of February 28, meaning that the State has, during a 
certain period, the right to oppose all prices declared by 
the company. 
A system of a priori control has been generally opposed in 
the sector. Companies want an a posteriori system of 
control, through a so-called "regime de preços vigiados 
(surveyed Price Regime)," which the State has refused. 
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The application of the Price Regime is complicated by the 
fiscal regime. Beer was subject to a high rate of "imposto 
de transacções (sales tax)" as compared with other Member-
States (more than 50 per cent of the amount of sales). 
There is presently a special tax on consumption of beer 
(Decree-Law NQ 343/85, of August 22, which is applicable to 
both production (ex-brewery) and import (from the time of 
clearing customs). This specific tax was calculated in a 
manner which tax collected as a result of "Imposto de 
Transacções" was not significantly modified. 
f) Typology of Competition 
This is a case of long time public monopoly exercised by two 
companies under a system of complete protection vis-à-vis 
external competition, through high entry barriers (expressed 
above all in a sixty per cent tax on importation and in the 
administrative control through the BRIs). 
However, it is still early to evaluate the extension and 
reach of this joint protection. 
In the internal plan, one must note that the Public 
Enterprises under consideration had distribution contracts 
with quasi-absolute territorial control, refusal of sale and 
State-imposed uniform prices, which were illegal in face of 
internal law of competition and which were the object of 
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sanctions by the competent administrative authorities 
6.2.5. Transports Sector 
a) Introduction 
In 1975, a railroad and an urban transport company and 
ninety-three road freight and passenger companies were 
nationalized, some of which were also involved in inter-
urban transportation: 
- "CP - Companhia dos Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses, 
SARL" (Decree-Law HQ 205-B/75, of April 16); 
- "Metropolitano de Lisboa, SARL" (Decree-Law NQ 280-
A/75, of April 16); 
- and ninety-three other companies (Decrees-Law NQ 280-
C/75, of June 05, and NQ 469-C/75, of August 28.) 
Also in 1975, by Decree-Law NQ 346/75, of July 03, the State 
became majority participant in another urban and suburban 
transport company, the "Companhia dos Carris de Ferro de 
Lisboa, SARL." 
Although it does not fulfill the formal and legal pre-
requisites of a Public Enterprise, the "STCP - Serviço de 
Transportes Colectivos do Porto", is, in practice, a true 
Public Enterprise, fully dependent on the Ministry of 
Control since 1975. 
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It originated when'a 1946 decision of the "Câmara Municipal 
do Porto" withdrew the concession from the operating 
company, the "Companhia Carris de Ferro do Porto." 
The STCP assures, under an exclusive regime, approximately 
66 per cent of transportation in its operational area, which 
includes the city of Oporto extending north in a radius of 
10 Km and south in a radius of 6 Km. 
In summary, the Public Enterprises and the main companies in 
which the State is majority holder in the transports sector 
are : 
Urban Transport: 
- "CCFL - Companhia Carris de Ferro de Lisboa, SA;" 
- "STCP - Serviços de Transportes Colectivos do Porto;" 
- "ML - Metropolitano de Lisboa, EP." 
Railroad Transport: 
- "CP - Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses, EP." 
Road Transport: 
- "RN - Rodoviária Nacional, EP." 
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Maritime and River Transport: 
- "TRANSTEJO -Transportes do Tejo, EP;" 
- "PORTLINE - Transportes Marítimos Internacionais, SA. 
Air Transport: 
- "TAP - Air Portugal;" 
- "ANA - Aeroportos e Navegação Aérea, EP." 
b) Control of Activity by the State 
The State has a de facto monopoly in most significant 
segments of the Transports sector. 
In the areas of urban and railroad transportation, the 
State control can be qualified as total. 
In each of these segments we are faped with "monoproduct" 
companies, operating in "monomarkets," with prices fixed by 
the Administration, having strong entry and exit barriers, 
and well defined public service objectives. 
Faced with such profound State intervention, the managements 
of companies are charged with assuring reliable services at 
the lowest cost possible, so they can respond to the 
evolution of the demand of a changing community. 
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c) Market Shares 
The State controls approximately fifty per cent of the road 
passenger and ten per cent of the cargo transport sub-
sector . 
The "RN - Rodoviária Nacional, EP," includes the ninety-
three nationalized companies, with corporate capital of 
3,500,000,000 Portuguese escudos. 
It owns a fleet of 2,700 passenger buses (47 per cent of the 
national fleet,) 440 cargo trucks and 33,000 Km of 
concession (55 per cent of continental Portugal) - based on 
1975 data. 
"CP," "CARRIS," "STCP," "ML" and "TRANSTEJO" control 100 per 
cent of their market. 
d) Financial Relations between the State and the Public 
Enterprises 
One must note the following particulars: 
i) There are compensatory indemnities because admini 
strative prices are, for several reasons, below 
cost ; 
ii) The autof i nanei ng of conipanies is, most of the 
times, negative; 
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iii) State endowments for financial recovery have been 
insufficient for the real needs of the companies. 
The following chart summarizes financial relations between 
the State and its companies in the sector, in 1987: 
In 1987, the following data is available: 
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Compensatory indemnities received by "CARRIS" for each 
carried passenger / Km were the following: 
- 1978 2$12 
- 1979 2$ 19 
- 1980 2$54 
- 1981 4$11 
- 1982 2$91 
- 1983 2$38 
- 1984 2$91 
- 1985 3$66 
6.2.6 Communications Sector 
a) Introduction 
The State has two Public Enterprises: 
- "CTT - Correios e Telecomunicações de Portugal 
- "TLP - Telefones de Lisboa e Porto" 
and a majority holding (83 per cent) in 
- "CPRM - Companhia Portuguesa Radio Marconi 
b) Control of Activity by the State 
The State tightly controls the companies through the 
monopoly exercised in both Public Enterprises and the 
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company in which it has ¿ι majority holding. 
"CTT/1LP" are, de facto, a merger of CWD Public Lnterpnees 
(with the same Board of Directors for both), but legally 
they are two distinct Enterprises, with different Histories. 
The origin of CTT was in 1V7U as a bpecitic public service ­
the "Administraçao­Geral dos Correios, Telégrafos e 
Telefones," included in the General Budget of the Lítate. 
TLP resulted from the redemption in 1967 of the concession 
of the Lisbon­Porto telephone network from "Anglo­Portuguese 
Telephone Co.," a private enterprise with foreign capital. 
It is clear that the management objective in each case wjb 
profoundly different: Cl Τ — Public Service; 1 LP ­
Profitability. 
Now constituted as a single Public Enterprise, they are the 
second largest investor in Portugal (30,ΟΟο,ΟΟΟ,ΟΟΟ 
Portuguese escudos per year), employ H 2 , 0 0 0 persons and have 
a monopoly on basic communications services: post, telephone 
and tele;:. 
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c) Market Shares 
The companies totally dominate the internal market in the 
exercise of their monopoly. 
d) Financial Relations between the State and the Public 
Enterprises ' 
In recent years, the companies have had positive results, 
not having received subsidies, or capital endowments. 
Quite the contrary, they have paid the State: 
- 1 per cent of revenues as rent; 
- special taxes on revenues from telephone calls (5 per 
cent); 
- 40 per cent on net profits. 
6.2.7. "Mass Media" Sector 
a) Introduction 
The following Public Enterprises are in found in this 
sector : 
- "RDP - Radiodifusão Portuguesa, EP" 
(Created by Decree-Law NQ 153/76, of February 23, as a 
result of nationalizations by Decree-Law NQ 674/75, of 
December 02, which had created the "Empresa Pública de 
Radiodifusão," integrating the nationalized companies, 
the "EN - Emissora Nacional de Radiodifusão," already 
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State owned); 
- "RTP - Radiotelevisão Portuguesa, EP" 
(Created by Decree-Law NQ 674-D/75, of December 02, 
which also nationalized the company "RTP - Radio 
Televisão Portuguesa, SARL"; 
- "EPNC - Empresa Pública dos Jornais Notícias e 
Capital"; 
- "EPSP - Empresa Pública dos Jornais Século e Popular" 
(created by Decree-Law NQ 639/76, of July 19, which 
nationalized four periodical publishing companies, that 
is, daily papers); and 
- "IMPRENSA NACIONAL - CASA DA MOEDA, EP." 
b) Control of Activity by the State 
The State presently controls important minority holdings in 
the mass media domain. 
In the television sub-sector, the existing Public Enterprise 
exercises a monopoly, although there are some actions in 
progress tending to promote its opening to the private 
sector. 
In addition, the State has a significant position, albeit 
indirect, in film production companies, studies and labora-
tories, including: 
- "Companhia Animatográfi ca Restauradores, SA" .... 88.3% 
- "Empresa Cinematográfica de S. Pedro, SA" 50% 
- "A Internacional - Sociedaçle de Cinema, Limitada" 50% 
- "Tóbis Portuguesa, SA" 30 to 50% 
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In the radio station sub-sector, the State controls all of 
the relevant companies with the exception of "Radio 
Renascença." De facto, they are integrated into RDP: 
- "Clube Radiofónico de Portugal"; 
- "Rádio Graça"; 
- "Rádio Peninsular"; 
- "Rádio Voz de Lisboa," 
as well as shares in the following companies 
- "ALFABETA - Radio e Publicidade, SA"; 
- "EAL - Emissoras Associadas de Lisboa, Limitada"; 
- "J. Ferreira & Companhia, Limitada"; 
- "Rádio Clube Português, SA"; 
- "Sociedade Portuguesa de Radiodifusão, Limitada." 
In the press sub-sector, the State exercises total control 
over some newspaper publishing companies, "Diário de Notíci-
as, "Diário Popular" and "Capital," and is a majority or 
significant participant in other daily newspaper publishing 
companies : 
- "Empresa 0 Comercio do Porto, SA" 50% 
- "Empresa do Jornal do Comércio, SA" 20 to 30% 
- "Empresa do Jornal de Notícias, SA" 50% 
- "Renascença Gráfica, SA" 33.2% 
as well as in other publishing companies: 
- "EDEL - Empresa Editorial Electrotécnica, SA" 50% 
- "EDIGUIA - Editora de Publicações, SA" 50% 
- "Editora Arcádia, SA" 70% 
- "FERGRAFICA - Artes Gráficas, Limitada" 100% 
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- "Gazeta das Aldeias" 72.4% 
- "Livraria Moraes Editores, SA" 98.88% 
- "RADIOPREL - Soe. de Act. Gráfica e Ed. Limitada" 75% 
- "SEFLA - Sociedade Editorial Flama, SA" 50% 
- "Sociedade Editora Record, Limitada" 70% 
In the news agency sub-sector, there were two, "ANOP" and 
the "Notícias de Portugal," which were abolished, and now 
there is one, a Public Interest Cooperative, the above-
mentioned "LUSA." 
d) Financial Relations between the State and the Public 
Enterpri ses 
In the last two years, Public Enterprises in this sector 
have received the following amounts: 
Γ II A R I X V I I 
' it a l e l ndowmei i l s l o Mass Med ia 
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Company 
RTP 
RDP 
ANOP * 
CPDP 
LPNC 
1 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1986 
1987 
1986 
1987 
1986 
1987 
1986 
1987 
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1 ÍJ 
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(*) -"Agência Noticiosa Portuguesa, IP',' abolished. 
Source : Reso Luf ion ol I I ie l'ou ne ι I ol Μ 1111 '-Ι ι» ι ·,, Ι) ι a ι 111 do Kepi ib I n a , I I ',er ι es , 
Ν? 174, of July i], 1986, and ι," 111, of" May 15, "TJi)"'/"Tf "ΓΓΊ islm(|-; m -
c I oded in I he .annex ) . 
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As concerns State endowments to the Mass Media sector, the 
general lines of the last Government's policy on the sector 
assumes particular relevance, as it will presumably be the 
same : 
i) To build a clear and objective framework of State 
endowments which gives equitable treatment to the 
public and private enterprises included in the 
sector ; 
ii) Financial support to be given by the State should be 
the object of an opinion given by a equalitarian 
technical commission; 
iii) Financial endowments anticipated are: 
- diffusion subsidies; 
- technological reconversion subsidies; 
- subsidies on education and cooperation actions; 
- postage paid to CTT; 
- discount on telecommunications and public 
transportation. 
7 . In Spai n 
7.1. Importance of the State Company Sector in the 
Economic Sectors 
The degree of intervention in the Public Sector in different 
areas of economic operation changes depending on the social 
and economic objectives fixed by the Government, such as: 
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- Obtaining revenues and regulari zation of consumption: 
the cases of the "Tabacalera" and of the "Campsa" for 
tobacco products and gasoline; 
- Presence in strategic sectors which demand high 
investments and high risks: the case of "Hispanoil" in 
which petroleum operations may contribute to reduce 
dependence on an external supply of petroleum; 
- Inter-regional equilibrium as concerns first-need 
goods: the cases of the "GESA" and of the "LiNELCO" 
which produce energy in insular territories at costs 
higher than continental prices; 
- Maintenance of employment, as in the transportation 
material sector with "AESA" and "ASTANO" and in the 
extracting sector with "HUNOSA"; 
- Rendering of public services, as in the cases of 
"RENFE" and "FEVE" whose operating revenues only cover 
personnel expenses. 
Attention must be called to various sectors, in absolute 
values, according to different indices: 
Sales - Petroleum and gas over the remaining, 
followed both by the transportation 
materials sector and by the 
communications and transports; 
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Employment - Transports, transportation materials and 
communications; 
GFFC - Energy, communications and transports; 
GVA - Communications, energy and transports; 
External Debt - Transportation materials, communications 
and energy; 
Exports - Transports, petrochemical industries and 
transportation materials; 
External commerce - Public Enterprises are important parti-
cipants in external commerce of merchan-
dise: 19.2 per cent of total imports and 
12.5 per cent of exports, particularly 
in the external commerce of energy pro-
ducts. Purchases to OPEC alone repre-
sent 44 per cent of their imports. 
As concerns non-energy products, the balance-is positive for 
the State Company Sector, with a coverage index of 167.7 per 
cent, which represents 113.9 per cent of the Spanish Economy 
i ndex. 
The sectors which contribute most favorably to the com-
mercial balance are: transports, through ""IBERIA";" trans-
portation material, through "SEAT" and "AESA;" ironworks, 
through "ENSIDESA" and "INESPA" and chemical through the 
petrochemical companies. 
The study continues with a sectorial analysis of the Public 
Enterprises' participation, which will be preceded by Chart 
XVIII showing 
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GVA, Employment and GFFC indices in the national economy, 
along with the specific weight of the Public Enterprises, 
both in the sectors under analysis and in the national 
economy. 
Included in the annex following this section, is a listing 
of the Public Enterprises in their respective sectors, 
showing the evolution of the main indices in the period from 
1983 to 1985. 
C H A R T X V I I I 
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7.1.1. Mineral Sector9 
The most important company is the "Hulleras del Noroeste -
HUNOSA" which absorbs almost 80 per cent of the public sec-
tor employment in this sector, 43 per cent of sales, 50 per 
cent of the yearly investment and over 55 per cent of the 
GVA. It is also the company with most losses in the sector. 
The "Empresa Nacional del Urânio - ENUSA" is second in sales 
with 34 per cent and first in external sales and in profits, 
which were 671 million Spanish pesetas in 1985. 
The presence of the State in this sector represents, in 
terms of Value Added, 2.7 per cent of the total State 
Company Sector participation and 5.3 per cent in terms of 
occupied manpower. 
In the extracting industries sector, Public Enterprises 
represent 51.3 per cent of the GVA and 47.3 per cent of 
employment. The average ratio GVA / employee is 3.1 per 
cent, which is a high ratio in a sector with an excess of 
value added. The reason is found in "ENUSA" which, alone, 
has a 9.2 per cent ratio. 
9 Cf. Annex 2, List 2 
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As concerns investments, the Public Enterprises absorb 23.2 
per cent of total investments in the sector. 
7.1.2. Industrial Sector 
7.1.2.1. Petroleum and Gas'Sub-Sector 
All companies mentioned are owned by INI (Cf. Annex 2, List 
2.) 
"HISPANOIL," whose activities are exploration and produc-
tion, made new gas discoveries in the Valley of the Guadal-
quivir, turning a first commercial exploration profitable. 
It has raised its investment in internal exploration by 70 
per cent, and gained access to new highly interesting areas 
in the producing zones of Angola, Gabon and Colombia. 
Due to the trend of lessening Spanish petroleum reserves 
while raising gas reserves, "HISPANOIL" production will 
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have to adapt to a new situation, in which its role will be 
of increasing importance. "HISPANOIL" also has reserves in 
foreign lands, due to developing works in Dubai, the United 
Kingdom and Guatemala. 
During 1985, INI integrated all of its refining activities 
into only one company ("EMP"). 
Sales of refined products remained static, as the break in 
sales in the internal market was compensated for by an 
increase in exports (40 per cent of the latter wa^ in light 
and medium destilled products, with the remaining 60 per 
cent i n fuel-oil.) 
"EMP" has shrunk its refining capacity to 25 million tons 
per year (39 per cent of the total national capacity,) by 
partially closing one refinery. It has also reduced its 
fleet, both owned and chartered, using 37 per cent, of the 
national fleet in 1985. 
Sales of natural gas increased 18 per cent in 1985. The 
"ENAGAS" investment, 9,043 million Spanish pesetas, went 
mainly to gasducts in Haro-Burgos and Bermeo-Lemona. 
The State has an important and increasing position in the 
sector, in which it participates in 32.2 per cent of the GVA 
(some points below 1984) and 51.5 per cent of the employ-
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ment (5 points above 1984,) due to its strategic character. 
Additionally, State participation in the sector represents, 
as compared to the total of the State Company Sector, 8.6 
per cent of the GVA and 1.4 per cent of the employment. 
Public Enterprise investment represented over two thirds of 
the total investment of the sector, thus its percentage of 
total national industrial investment was approximately 9 per 
cent. 
7.1.2.2. Electric bnergy Sub-Sector 
This sector has been subject to a restructuring since 1983, 
during which a financial recovery program started. In 1984, 
a system of internal compensations was delineated, and in 
1985, an interchange of assets was created. Also during 
this year norms were published tending to secure at a medium 
term the financial capacity of the electricity companies as 
well as meeting the demands of public service (Cf. Annex 2, 
List 2.) 
State participation includes five companies owned by INI, 
three in the Iberian Penninsula ("ENDESA," "ENHER" and 
"ENCASUR") and two on Spanish islands ("GESA" and "UNELCO".) 
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The two first companies had an interchange of assets between 
them as well as with other private companies in this sector. 
The investments of the entirety of Public Enterprises in 
this sector were a very high, partially due to "ENDESA's" 
acquisition of 214,333 million Spanish pesestas in material 
assets which had belonged to private companies. 
In addition, the "Red Electrica de España - REDESA" was 
created with non-monetary contribution from "ENDESA" and 
"ENHER" of 24,368 million Spanish pesetas. 
"REDESA" has been commissioned to undertake a unified ex-
ploration of the high voltage network of the national elec-
tric system which had previously been nationalized. The 
"ENDESA" group has public ownership of the company, with a 
51 per cent holding. 
As a consequence of a 3.7 per cent increase in demand from 
1984 to 1985, the electricity production of these companies 
also increased: "ENDESA" 7.6 per cent, "GESA" 5.9 per cent, 
"UNELCO" 7.8 per cent and "ENASUR" 9.7 per cent (however, 
"ENHER" production dropped by 7.3 per cent due to a drop in 
use of water-generated electricity during 1985.) 
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"ENDESA" is the company showing the highest profits in the 
INI group. 
The above-mentioned companies have a market quota of 28.9 
per cent, generate almost 25 per cent of the value added in 
the sector (one per cent less than in 1984) and occupy 20 
per cent of manpower (also one per cent less than in 1984.) 
This is one of the sectors in which the public sector has 
greatest relevance, both in relative terms, due to its 
strategic character, and in absolute terms, due to the 
volume shown by the several indices. 
7.1.2.3. Base Metal Industry Sub-Sector 
Steel production in Spain increased by 5 per cent from 1984 
to 1985; internal demand stabilized as opposed to exports 
which increased (Cf. Annex 2, List 2.) 
Public Enterprises showed a similar evolution. 
Thus, "ENSIDESA" increased sales by 2.8 per cent, due to the 
compensation operated by the increase in exports (27 per 
cent). During that year, it also developed projects antici-
pated in the Project for Restructuring, whicn required an 
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investment of 236,494 million Spanish pesetas, while re-
ducing the number of employees by 1,297, in accordance with 
the labor restructuring plan. 
The "Altos Hornos del Mediterraneo - AHM" ended the recon-
version process by reducing the number of workers by 1,273. 
Assets and liabilities belonging to the cold-rolling factory 
were also requested and the "Empresa Siderurgica del Medi-
terraneo - SIDMED," was created as a branch of "ENSIDESA." 
"FOARSA" also achieved the labor goals of the reconversion 
plan. As opposed to the above-mentioned companies, the drop 
in internal demand was not compensated by exports, due to 
the strong international competition to which it is subject. 
"Prerreducidos Integrados del Suroeste de España - PRESUR" 
continued its investment process, both starting the con-
struction of iron ore concentrates and the experimentation 
process of ironworks improvement. 
It should be noted that aluminium, a sector with world sup-
ply greater than demand, registered an approximately 11 per 
cent growth in consumption in Spain compared to the previous 
year, although at a lesser rate than the year before. 
Meanwhile, it closed the Valladolid electrólisis factory 
and 50 per cent of the Series I in Aviles, reducing the 
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number of workers by 339. 
At the national level, the "INESPAL" group produces 100 per 
cent of alumina, 100 per cent of the electroli t i cal alumi-
nium of first fusion and 57 per cent of the transformed 
products. 
On the whole, the sector is subject to an 'important partici-
pation by the Public Sector, particularly at the GFFC level 
with 42 per cent, which is almost equivalent to one quarter 
of the national sector in terms of GVA and employment. 
7.1.2.4. Transformation Metal Industry 
Sub-Sector 
In this sector, companies producing equipments and metal 
products are considered. On the whole, the influence of 
Public Enterprises is small, with the exception of invest-
ment which accounts for 13 per cent of the sector (Cf. Annex 
2, List 2.) 
"Babcock Wilcox Española - BWE" assumed the market leader-
ship in boilers, energy and mechanical constructions, having 
increased sales volume as compared to the previous year by 
25 per cent. 
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The "Maquinista Terrestre y Maritima - MTM," although ex-
periencing difficulties which forced it to begin labor 
readjustments, signed important contracts with "ENSIDESA," 
"FEVE" and "METRO," and now has a more optimistic future. 
The "Equipos Nucleares - ENSA," which supplies equipment for 
nuclear energy plants, had to reduce its activity at a na-
tional level due to the National Energy Plan, without 
hurting its interests in the external market, such as in 
India and the USA. 
The "Empresa Nacional Santa Barbara de Industrias Militares" 
is, along BWE, the most important Public Enterprise in the 
sector. 
7.1.2.5. Transport Materials Industry Sub-
Sector 
This sector is characterized by a strong presence of Public 
Enterprises, mainly because most transportation material 
belongs to State owned shipyards, absorbing 100 per cent of 
the big shipyards and 56 per cent of the small and medium 
ones. 
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The naval construction crisis brought on by a persistent 
lack of demand, forcing a Plan of reconversion of the sec-
tor, in which over 8,000 work places in Public Enterprises 
were eliminated. 
The "Artilleros Españoles - AESA," the most relevant Public 
Enterprise as concerns naval construction, reduced its 
losses by 30 per cent; although the commission portfolio is 
still insufficient, the new Fleet Plan offers perspectives 
for the reactivation of internal demand. 
As concerns air transport material, the company "Con-
strucciones Aeronáuticas - CASA" has been showing a con-
tinuous and increasing effort in technological innovation, 
as witnessed by its participation in such international 
projects as AIRBUS, EFA, ARIANE, etc. (Cf. Annex 2, List 2.) 
The "Sociedad Española de Automóviles Turísticos - SEAT," 
via which the State was involved in fabrication of tourist 
vehicles, concluded negotiations with "Volkswagen" during 
1985, the latter having acquired a majority participation in 
SEAT's capital. 
As concerns industrial vehicles, the "Empresa Nacional de 
Auto-camiones - ENASA" holds a quota of 42.9 per cent in a 
market in which there is strong pressure from importers. 
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As concerns Public Enterprises, their exports correspond to 
approximately 50 per cent of the total sales. 
7.1.2.6. Chemical Industry Sub-Sector 
This group are includes the "Empresa Nacional de Fertili-
zantes," which is owned by INI, and companies producing 
petroleum dérivâtes in which INI has holdings; as a whole, 
they are economically recovered (Cf. Annex 2, List 2.) 
This sector represented one per cent of the'State's parti-
cipation in the company sector as concerns GVA, as well as 
0.8 per cent of the total employment in Public Enterprises. 
The State does not have significant presence in the sector, 
holding only 2.2 per cent of the GVA, 3 per cent of employ-
ment and 5 per cent of the investment. In 1985, foreign in-
vestments comprised 36 per cent of all investments in this 
sector, most of the capital coming from EEC countries with a 
higher concentration in sub-sectors with higher value added. 
The Fertilizer sector is now part of a National Reconversion 
Plan. 
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7.1.2.7. Cellulose Sub-Sector 
The "Empresa Nacional de Celulosa - ENCE" is the only Public 
Sector representative in paper pulp production. Thus, the 
State-Entrepreneur occupies only 2.2 per cent of the GVA and 
2.1 per cent of employment in the sector (Cf. Annex 2, List 
2). 
Paper pulp production has a reduced significance in the 
State Company Sector, representing only 1.1 per cent of GVA, 
1.2 per cent of employment and 0.6 per cent of investment. 
7.1.2.8. Textile, Leather and Footwear Industries 
Sub-Sector 
State participation in this sector is owned by four com-
panies in the "Património" group, not being significant in 
terms of GVA and employment (0.9 and 1.6 per cent respec-
tively), but having some expression in investment (4.6 per 
cent of the sector). 
The reduced value of indices is justified by the atomization 
of the sector, which is divided 'among a multitude of small 
and medium companies, the market quota of the Public Enter-
prises being small. 
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The State Participation is large in terms of losses (ac-
counting for 6,837 million Spanish pesetas for the four com-
panies in 1985), of which 2,934 million Spanish pesetas rep-
resent losses by "IMEPIEL" (Cf. Annex 2, List 2.) 
Because it is a sector in crisis, it has also been subject 
to labor restructuring measures, Public Enterprises having 
reduced employment by one thousend workers since 1985. 
The specific weight of these Public Enterprises in the State 
Company Sector is quite small. 
7.1.2.9. Food, Drink and Tobacco Industry 
Sub-Sector 
This sector includes, on one hand, the "Empresa Nacional de 
Industrias de la Alimentación - ENDIASA," a sub-holding com-
pany held by INI and which includes the "Carnes y Conservas 
- CARCESA," the "Grupo Lactaria Española - LESA," the Ole-
aginosas - OESA" and the "FRIDARAGO" and, on the other hand, 
the tobacco company "TABACALERA" (Cf. Annex 2, List 2.) 
The food products group shows a negative evolution in its 
results, particularly as concerns "CARCESA" and "FRIDARAGO" 
- 186 
(however, the "LESA" group has been improving, despite 
strong competition in this market.) 
The 1985 drop in sales, of 27 per cent as compared with the 
previous year, was mainly due to "OESA's" selection policy, 
"OSEA bring the company with the highest sales rate and the 
largest exporter in the group. "CARCESA" initiated a pro-
cess of divestment in its cattle products producing branches 
"FRIGSA" and "GYPISA," although its additional activity in 
tomato concentrate compensates for negative weight in the 
meat products area. "FRIDARAGO" is also having difficulties 
in its frozen vegetables divison. 
In 1985, "TABACALERA" went through a crucial phase of tran-
sition from 350 year old historic and traditional monopoly 
to a new company structure and philosophy. 
The joint investments of Public Enterprises in the food, 
drink and tobacco sector account for 14.8 per cent of the 
sector at a national level. 
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7.1.2.10. Other Manufactures 
In the sector of other manufactures the only Public 
Enterprise directly included is the "Grupo de Empresas 
Alvares - GEA" which is owned by INI and whose activity 
consists of the production of ceramic, glass articles, etc. 
(Cf. Annex 2, List 2.) 
This is the sector which shows the lowest values in all in-
dices under consideration, both as concerns the State Com-
pany Sector and the entirety of sectors of the national eco-
nomy. Thus, the incidence of "GEA" in the national economy 
is irrelevant, although it plays an important role in the 
sector, particularly as concerns employment (6.9 per cent of 
the sector) and, to a lesser degree, in terms of GVA (2.5 
per cent.) 
Internal sales increased 16 per cent from 1984 to 1985, 
while exports were maintained; results are negative with no 
increasing trend. 
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7.1.2.11. Electronic and Computer Industry 
Sub-Sector 
According to criteria established in the "Plano Nacional de 
Electrónica e Informática (PEIN)," a sub-holding company for 
the electronics and computer industry, "INISEL," was created 
in 1985, comprising a group of companies including "ENOSA," 
"PESA," "ERIA," "I. CUATRO," "ISEL," "TELESINCRO" and 
"ERDISA." Its objective is to rationalize the supply and 
company specializations. "INISEL" sales increased by 24 per 
cent with results changing from loss to profit; 1985 profits 
were 192 million Spanish pesetas when in 1984, there were 
losses of 146 million Spanish pesetas (Cf. Annex 2, List 2.) 
An important part of "INISEL's" industrial electronics ac-
tivity is in European joint projects (such as "FACA" and 
the "AIRBUS," which allow it to develop in more technolog-
ical advanced areas) in military projects (such as the sys-
tems for control of access to Madrid and Barcelona.) 
This sector is not particularly representative as concerns 
the dimension of the indices, but due to its nature, it has 
strategic importance. Some 8.1 per cent of investments in 
the sector belonged to INI companies, the incidence in the 
national economy of 0.03 per cent of the GVA, 0.02 per cent 
of employment and 0.03 per cent .of the GFFC. 
189 -
7.1.2.12. Construction Industry Sub-Sector 
This sector includes the INI-owned "Empresa Auxiliar de la 
Industria - AUXINI," and the "Empresa Nacional de Autopistas 
- ENAUSA," "TRAGSA," "IMPROASA" and "SGV" (Cf. Annex 2, List 
2.) 
"AUXINI" profitted from the reactivation of the sector to 
increase its market quota by 0.5 per cent over 1984. Its 
commission portfolio increased by 32 per cent, sales by 30 
per cent, the number of workers by 663 and results were 
substantially improved. 
"TRAGSA" is the Public Enterprise in the sector with the 
highest volume in the indices, with the exception of 
employment which declined by 199. 
This sector has a great dimension in the economy, as opposed 
to the incidence of the Public Sector, which is small: 1.5 
per cent of the GVA, 0.8 per cent of employment, but 5.4 per 
cent of investment. 
In macro-values it represents 0.1 per cent of the GVA, 0.04 
per cent of employment and 0.05 per cent of the GFFC. 
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7.1.3. Transports Sector 
In this sector "IBERIA," which is the most important company 
as concerns sales, both in the internal and the external 
market, with 55 per cent of sales of all Public Enterprises 
in this sector (Cf. Annex 2, List 2.) 
In land transportatio, the most impoartant is "RENFE," one 
of the Public Enterprises employing the most workers 
(65,907) and having the most investments (77 per cent of the 
total for Public Enterprises in the transports sector.) 
The presence of the State Company Sector is very important 
here (30.7 per cent of the GVA and 31.1 per cent of employ-
ment). In terms of national economy it represents 1.1 per 
cent of the GVA, 9.6 per cent of employment and 1.1 per cent 
of the GFFC. 
7.1.4. Communications Sector 
The communications sector is dominated by the State Company 
Sector, although the "Compania Telefonica," which has 
privately held majority participation, must be taken into 
account (Cf. Annex 2, List 2). 
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The sector-has some importance in the macro-economic whole: 
1.7 per cent of the GVA, 0.6 per cent of employment and 3.6 
per cent of the GFFC. 
7.1.5. Commercial Sector 
In the entirety of the Public Enterprises, the most impor-
tant here is "CAMPSA," representing 78 per cent of all 
sales, 92 per cent of employment, 71 per cent of the GFFC 
and 92 per cent of the GVA of the commercial sector, as it 
can be seen in List 2, Annex 2. The sector, which has the 
most weight in the national sectorial list, does not show 
great State or State company presence (only 1.4 per cent of 
the GVA and 1.1 per cent of employment,) which means, in 
terms of national economy, 0.04 per cent of the GVA, 0.1 per 
cent both of employment and of the GFFC. 
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7.2. Behavior of State Monopolies and Other Public 
Enterprises in Basic Sectors of the Economy 
7.2.1. Adaption of Commercial Monopolies 
In Spain, the two existing monopolies — tobacco and 
petroleum -- are subject to the necessary adaption, for 
which they have a six year transition period. 
The main laws to execute community imperatives are: 
. Royal Decree-Law NQ 7/84, of June 13, concerning 
imports of petroleum products; 
. Law NS 45/84, on the regulation of the petroleum 
sector ; 
. Decree-Law NQ 5/85, of December 12, on the adaption of 
the petroleum monopoly, complemented by Decree NQ 
2401/85, of December 27, which approved the Statute for 
distribution activity of petroleum products imported 
from the EEC; 
. Bill on special taxation as concerns tobaccos. 
The new regulation of the petroleum sector is via: 
Permission for the Government to negotiate the transfer 
to "CAMPSA" of the entirety of assets and rights which 
belonged to the State and which belonged to the petro-
leum monopoly; 
Permission for INI to permit the entry of private re-
fineries in the corporate capital of "CAMPSA," with the 
condition that public participation remain over 50 per 
cent. 
193 
Integration of fabrication and distribution and commer-
cialization were necessary, due to the disappearance of the 
economic-commercial aspect of the monopoly. 
Decree-Law NQ 5/85 aims mainly the 1 egal-admini strati ve side 
of the monopoly. Participation of petroleum in primary en-
ergy consumption in Spain will be maintained at over 50 per 
cent in the coming years. Securing the necessary supply 
will continue to be essential for the Spanish economy. 
Similarly, attention must be paid to the relative ends of 
petroleum products. 
This legislation, as concerns products imported from the 
EEC, allows distribution by wholesalers and the dismantling 
of a good part of the economic-commercial content of the 
monopoly, which, in addition to limiting its functional 
sphere of application, guarantees Spanish accomplishment of 
the applicable provision of the Treaty of Accession. 
The most important aspects of the above-mentioned Decree-Law 
are : 
- New definition of the monopoly's objectives; 
- Indication of petroleum products produced in Spain, 
which may only be commercialized in the geographic area 
of the monopoly by "CAMPSA*' and "BUTANO;" 
- Freedom of distribution and commercialization of 
products originating in the EEC (Decree NQ 2401/85 
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defining the concrete conditions of action demanded 
from operators, within the limits of the contigents 
established by the Treaty of Accession); 
Maintenance of "CAMPSA" as the monopoly managing 
company for petroleum products, "BUTANO" being included 
as concerns petroleum derived gases; 
Maintenance of the commercial network with the present 
concession holders: these will not be allowed to sell 
carburetants or liquid fuels not supplied by "CAMPSA", 
until a new regulation on sale locations and retail 
sales of these products is approved; 
Freedom to import petroleum products from EEC member 
countries, in accordance with the Treaty of Accession. 
The Government can determine the origin and acquisition 
of the part to be used in fabrication of products whose 
distribution will be in the sphere of application of 
the monopoly; 
Free export of petroleum products in accordance with 
community legislation. 
As concerns the tobacco monopoly, Spain will have a four 
year period from the date of the accession to make pro-
gressively the type of proportional tax on black tobacco 
cigarettes equal to that on the remaining cigarettes. 
Abolishment of the existing difference in taxation as of the 
date of accession will occur in five equal phases, reporting 
to January 01 of each year. 
The derogation of the presently enforced laws of Spain, as a 
consequence of the accession, is based on Law NQ 38/85, of 
November 22, which entered into force on January 01, 1986. 
In accordance with community principles, this law changes 
the previous situation in the following points: 
Abolishment of the "Renta de Tabacos," whose revenues 
must be absorbed by the special tax on the consumption 
of tobaccos and the value added tax; 
Maintenance of a fabrication monopoly, as well as one 
on the imports and distribution of non-community 
manufactured tobacco, under the management of the 
"Tabacalera, SA" which will integrate the assets 
affected into the monopoly by State share-holding; 
Liberalization of the imports and commercialization by 
wholesalers of manufactured tobaccos proceding from the 
Communi ty ; 
Maintenance of the retail sale monopoly, which is 
exercised through the "Expedicúrias de Tabaco y Timbre" 
which are considered in this law as having a State 
concession. 
The tutelage and control of management of the monopoly 
belongs to the "Centro Directivo del Ministério de Economia 
y Finanças," which assumes the Government delegation in the 
"Tabacalera." 
The conditions of supply will be homogeneous for all whole-
salers and in the full sphere of application of the monopoly 
and only be done to retail salers holding the concession 
from the State may be supplied. The Ministry of Economy and 
Finance provides said concessions. 
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7.2.2. Mineral Sector (Non-Energy) 
This sector is regulated by the "Ley de Fomento de la Min-
eria," of 1977, and by the National Plan for the Supply of 
Mineral Raw Materials, of 1978, which is subject to an 
biennial revision. 
In 1983 State endowments accounted for 3,394.10 million 
Spanish pesetas, of which 2,204.00 were designated for 
infrastructural works under the auspices of the "Instituto 
Geológico y Minero de España." 
In 1984, a trend toward substituting public or private cred-
its for capital endowments began, with the aim of developing 
more investments. 
These measures show the sectorial character of the "Ley de 
Fomento de la Mineria," as well as its highly intervention-
ist tone in the delinetaing the objectives of State Plan-
ning. NQ 1 of Article 149 of the Constitution determines 
the exclusive competence of the State for the definition of 
the bases of the energy and mining regime. 
Thus, the Public Enterprises "E. N. ADARO" and "CARBOEX" 
must support the planning policy. 
197 -
7.2.3.. Industrial Sector 
7.2.3.1. Petroleum Sub-Sector 
Company activities in this sector are: 
. Exploration and production of crude; 
. Refining; 
. Distribution and commercialization. 
Public intervention covers three activities in different de-
grees, coverage is total for distribution and commercializa-
tion of petroleum products, which "CAMPSA" effects under the 
name of and on behalf of the monopoly (Cf. Annex 2, List 2.) 
In a general, the intervention of the Administration is 
translated into the following: 
Regulation of companies activities, justified by both 
the strategic character of the product and the dangers 
of its manipulation; 
Determination of existing economic fluctuations between 
companies in the sector, with deciding influence over 
the companies accounts. 
As concerns the exploration and production of crude, the 
State must define the origin and conditions of acquisition 
of some part of crude which is unloaded in Spanish refining 
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terminals. This volume of petroleum, named State quota or 
commerce quota, accounts for 30 per cent of unloaded crude. 
The foreign production of the Public Enterprise "Hispanoil" 
is included in the quota and thus, the Administration, both 
fixes the sale price of its production and guarantees the 
sale of the crude independently of its sale price. 
Ninety per cent of petroleum which is unloaded in Spain must 
be carried by ships sailing under the national flag, with 
freight conditions also determined by the Administration. 
Finally, as concerns refining, public intervention is exer-
cised mainly through the petroleum monopolies, which commer-
cializes the most important petroleum products in the 
Penninsula and the Balearic Islands. 
The Administration fixes both the quantities and sale prices 
of approximately 60 per cent of refinery production. In 
1985, Spain manufactured 44.8 million tons of crude, of 
which the monopoly acquired 23.2 million tons. 
Price of public sale is structured as follows: 
"Ex-refinery" price is officialy fixed, monthly or 
quarterly, as a function the of crude and its products 
priced in the international market based on the United 
States dollar exchange rate; 
"CAMPSA" tariff and retail sales commission; 
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Taxes (12 per cent VAT and special tax on carburetants 
for consumption and the "renta" of petroleum.) 
The latter is a fiscal fee fixed in residual form, reflect-
ing the difference between the sales price and the above-
mentioned costs, and constitutes a revenue for the monopoly 
The sector is under the process of liberalization as shown 
i n poi nt 7.2 . 1 . . 
7.2.3.2. Gas Sub-Sector 
The Spanish gas industry produces, supplies and distributes 
gas carburetants for use as both a carburetant and a raw 
mater i al. 
Royal-Decree NQ 1350/76, of June 07, declares supplying, 
production, warehousing, conduction and distribution 
activities of natural gas to have preferential interest. 
Under the terms of this provision, these activities will be 
given the benefits of expropriation, customs bonuses and 
free amortization in the first five years, if certain pre-
requisites are respected. 
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The General Regulation of the Public Service of Carburetant 
Gases, which was approved by Decree NQ 2913/73, of October 
26, establishes in Article 1 that the Ministry of Industry 
is in charge of regulating the concession regime, supplying 
conditions, fees, etc.. 
The price policy is regulated by Protocol of July 23, 1985, 
which ratified unification of the fee structure, for both 
the domestic and commercial markets and the industrial mar-
ket, establishing natural gas prices as a function of the 
prices of alternative energies, simultaneously serving as an 
incentive for the consumption of natural gas. 
Among the seventeen gas supply companies, the Public Enter-
prise "E. N. del Gas" occupies the first place with 36 per 
cent of the market. 
The future expansion of gas carburetants will be based on 
natural gas, which will constitute the main source of demand 
from 1988. For this anticipated expansion, the existence of 
natural gas reservoirs is of some importance, such as those 
in Serrablo and Gaviota, presently connected to the National 
Network of Gasducts. 
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7.2.3.3. Electricity Sub-Sector 
In 1985, the process of revision of the Spanish electric 
sector, with the aim of obtaining a greater equilibrium 
between production and the market, ended. 
Total net production of electric energy in Spain went up to 
120,578 G.X.H, increasing 6.3 per cent as compared to 1984. 
This production resulted both from Public Sector-owned 
plants in the Penninsula (94.2 per cent) and in the 
Balearios, Ceuta and Melilla (3.2 per cent). 
The Administration determines the level of prices so that 
global costs of the sector may be covered; however, the 
existence of an equilibrium between revenues and costs in 
the entirety of the sector does not mean the equilibrium 
exists in each and everyone of the companies in the sector. 
Thus, as prices do not show the same level of coverage of 
associated costs, some companies are unbalanced. 
Compatibility between a unique system of global costs and a 
whole of companies with objectively different character-
istics via the law of compensations is accomplished. 
The two main mechanisms used in Spain for compensations are: 
!02 
. The "Oficina de Compensaciones de la Energia Eléctrica 
- Of ico;" 
. The inter-company system of compensations. 
Additionaly, "Ofico" compensates certain costs in the coal 
and natural gas areas and in special extra-penninsular ser-
vices, analysing: 
The different costs of investment and exploration of 
the different types of plants; 
The composition of the production park of each company; 
The time during which investment took place. 
Total costs are not compensated in the transferences; how-
ever, the coverage rate is very high (92 per 'cent in 1985.) 
There are furhter incentives through which a company with 
lower unit cost keeps part of the difference between that 
and the average cost. 
Companies with lower production must buy from companies with 
surplus production in order to secure supply. Connected 
payments are called power quotas. 
In 1985, five electric systems tranferred 25,075 million 
Spanish pesetas to the remaining five, an amount equivalent 
to 4.8 per cent of the standard production costs. 
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7.2.3.4. Chemical Sub-Sector 
a) Fertilizers 
The fertilizer sector assumes a strategic character in the 
Spanish economy. 
Royal Decree NQ 295/85 approved the Reconversion Plan for 
the Fertilizer Sector, whose regulations continue to provide 
for the interchange of assets among the groups included in 
the sector. 
The "Empresa Nacional de Fertilizantes" holds a 43 per cent 
quota in the national market of simple nitrogen fertilizers. 
The Price Regime changed in 1985, with the introduction of a 
system for fixing fertilizer prices, consisting of maximum 
public sale quotas which change every month of the year. 
With different monthly prices, the objective aims at stimu-
lating the purchase of fertilizers in pre-campaingn periods, 
establishing official discounts of general public knowledge. 
Commercial concepts retained in the fixing of prices are: 
. Cost of entry and exit for merchandise in the 
warehouse ; 
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. Warehousing of the merchandise, average stocking 
monthly price; 
. Transport to the final destination. 
b) Petrochemical Industry 
The petrochemical Industry is structured in three groups: 
i) the State group, which includes the "Empresa Nacio-
nal del Petróleo" and its four branches ("Alcudia," 
"Calatrava," "Montoro" and "Popular"), representing 
some 27 per cent of the Spanish petrochemical 
i ndustry; 
ii) Private groups, which includes important companies 
such as "CEPSA," "ERT," "AISCONDEL," etc., holding 
26 to 30 per cent of this industry; 
iii) Branches of multinational companies, .with holdings 
of approximately 40 to 50 per cent in this sector. 
The first group, held by INH, manufactures 100 per cent of 
butadien, estyrene, propylene oxide, propylene gl icoles, 
aer i 1onitr i le, acetancyandrine, cyanidric acid, eva and 
synthetic rubber as well as over 50 per cent of the national 
production of ethilene, propylene, methyl metacril and high 
and low density poiiethylene. 
In January 01, 1986, as a result of the accession, a sub-
stantial change occured in the framework of commercial ex-
changes with the EEC, due to the application of VAT and the 
immediate abolition of the "Impuesto de Tráfico de Empresas 
- ITE" and of the "Compensación de Gravámenes Interiores -
ICGI." 
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The latter -represented an additional protectionist measure 
applied to the CIF value of the imported product, to which 
the corresponding customs tariff was added and, as opposed 
to the VAT, it was not refundable to the importer, creating 
a protection superior to that of the customs tariffs. 
Additionally, it negatively assesses the sector the customs 
tariff a 10 per cent reduction beginning January 01, 1986. 
External commerce of petrochemical products Spain-EEC showed 
a remarkable surpluss in 1985. However, in 1986 the trend 
was opposite, with imports increasing by 58 per cent during 
the first semester. 
Total exports diminished by 7 per cent; but, one must take 
into account the strong development of internal demand with 
petrochemical industries less feeling the need to export to 
maintain the high production level of their factories. 
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7.2.4. Transports Sector 
Two companies in the sector hold concessions for public 
services: "IBERIA" and its branch "AVIACO" for regular air 
transport operations and "RENFE" for operation of the 
Spanish railroads. 
a) "IBERIA" 
The concession granted to "IBERIA" for the operation of the 
public service of regular air transport comes from June 07, 
1940, having been granted for twenty years in a monopolistic 
regime for domestic lines; said concession was extended for 
an indeterminate period by the "Lei de Navegação Aérea." 
The public service regime applies only to regular services. 
The line plan granted to "IBERIA" was approved by a decree 
of 1944, which established the need for an administrative 
authorization for the beginning and modes of operating each 
of the lines. Meanwhile, the concession of new lines is 
subject to the Law of Air. Navigation, which needs permission 
of the Air Ministry and approval by the Council of 
Ministers. 
In the concession of regular ai) transport, public author-
ities withheld a group of prerogatives common to this type 
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of concesión 
Definition of fees; 
Imposition of technical conditions in the rendering of 
services ; 
Redemption before the expiration of the term without 
providing an explanation. 
As concerns the financial regime, the rule is the 
equilibrium, being exceptional the anticipated endowment. 
Funds which "IBERIA" expects to receive to compensate some 
fares for the rendering of services to certain users are of 
a different nature of endowments. This type of reductions, 
implying a political price, benefit the user and not the 
company. 
"IBERIA" also holds the air mail transport concession, 
giving it important funds as a compensation which is 
regulated by a contract of July 23, 1941. 
As concerns international services, the concession generally 
derives from bilateral State agreements, usually negotiated 
under IATA auspices. The National Air Administration holds 
the general powers of traffic police but not those which are 
held by the entity holding the concession, such as fare 
determination, technical inspection, etc.. 
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b) "RENFE" 
"RENFE" originating in the railroad Regulatory Law of Jan-
uary 24, 1941, and the Decree of July 11, 1941, is a public 
establishment which is in charge of railroad operation. 
There is a Regulatory framwork settling costs which are not 
imputable to the management of "RENFE": it was created by 
Decree NQ 372/82, of February 12, O. M. of June 10, 1974, 
Agreement of the Council of Ministers of February 21, 1975 
and 0. M. of January 07, 1980, including: 
- Negative results of the deficit producing lines of the 
secondary network; 
- Railroad personnel dues to the "Mutualidad de Trans-
porte y Comunicaciones," which "RENFE" abandoned; 
- 50 per cent of the maintenance cost of railroad 
crossi ngs; 
- 50 per cent of the financial charges on external loans, 
by vouchers of 100 million United States dollars which 
substituted State contribution by debit to the "Fundo 
de Acção Conjuntural"; 
- Difference between the commercial tariff and commercial 
prices for transportation of minerals. 
"RENFE" produces large deficits, has major infrastructural 
charges. Increase in tariffs is realised through decision 
of the Ministry of Transports and Communications. 
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7.2.5. Communications Sector 
By the Law of December 31, 1945, the Government was author-
ised to sign a contract with the "Compañía Telefonica Naci-
onal de España"; the contract, which regulates the basis of 
concession, had been approved by Decree of October 31, 1946. 
Thus, the Telephone Company is a public company limited by 
shares whose activity is regulated by said contract. 
The applicable fiscal regime derives from Clause 7 of the 
contract, which provides that the State participates in rev-
enues, annually receiving a "canon" of 15 per cent of net 
profits and an amount which cannot be less than 6 per cent 
of the gross operating revenues. These amounts are con-
sidered taxes for all legal purposes. Until now, the 
company has been exempt from all other taxes. However, 
telephone billing is now subject to VAT, and, starting this 
year, it is also subject to local and municipal taxes. 
Clause 19 of the contract establishes a regime of tariff 
authorization, subject to revision at the company's request 
whenever revenues are not sufficient in two successive 
financial years to: 
. Cover operating costs; 
. Satisfy the necessary reserves for depreciation of 
locations and equipment; 
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Accumulating and maintaining the contractual reserve 
anticipated by clause 7 of the contract, or any other 
which.is provided by law, obtaining a surplus in each 
financial year not less than the sum of the invested 
capital with the reserve funds provided in line b) of 
Clause 24. 
The company is also forced, due to traffic needs and by the 
demands of the concession regime, to maintain permanently an 
investment plan guaranteeing the rendering of services with 
the most modern and efficient equipment. 
In summation, attention must be called to the fact that ap-
proval the Regulatory Law of Telecommunications (LOT) is now 
pendi ng. 
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